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ABSTRACT 
Vigilantism is a reality that is going to persist into the future for as long as crime 
exists. The Diepsloot community is not unique to other parts of the country like 
Khayelitsha, New Brighton, Gugulethu and others in resorting to mob justice. The 
satisfaction sourced from eliminating a criminal (s) seems to fuel the resolve around 
this method of justice. The scourge of crime is pretexted as the main reason behind 
the mob attacks which the community qualifies by the claim that the police are 
incapable to police crime. 
The Diepsloot community knows the moral and legal restrictions around crime of this 
magnitude but their knowledge of police incapacity allows them to justify this 
horrendous act. Mob justice incidents may not be occurring daily but their spread 
across the calendar is an uncomfortable reality everyone should be concerned of. 
The community, especially the victims, suffer permanent scars of fear and the 
burden on victim families is enormous.  Victim families tend to grapple with 
permanent problem of dependants that have been incapacitated by the mob attacks. 
By far, victim families believe that perpetrators continue with impunity and the law-
enforcement has revised intervention strategies. 
Multitask teams (like churches, youth, men’s forum and sport) have been formed to 
reach out to the community but somehow no objective needs-analysis have been 
conducted thus the products are right but have no consumers. The role played by 
the police in community projects is acknowledged but the coordination structure is 
too centralised to purport local ownership. 
The concepts of moral regeneration and social cohesion have to find practical 
studies in the community of Diepsloot so as to comprehend the interest of the 
residents and be impactful to do paradigm shift. 
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Diepsloot is home to over 250 000 families many of which live in shacks and 
scramble for survival. As a result of unemployment and congestion, the area has 
become a magnet for criminal elements resulting in the community organising itself 
to protect and eliminate criminal activities www.diepsloot.com, 2012: 1). The 
community organisation, later fuelled by the coming of Mapogo-a-Mathamaga, 
started with all the good intention of neighbourhood watch and community policing 
forums but later became a vehicle through which brutality was unleashed on the 
same community that was supposed to benefit. 
Vigilantism has existed in South Africa for many years, although its nature and shape 
have changed over time, especially in the post-1994 democratic dispensation. The 
change is observable in the methods used to intimidate law-abiding elements of 
communities to never co-operate with law enforcement agencies or disclose 
perpetrators of vigilantism. As a result, the South African Police Services (SAPS) 
encounter difficulties in settling the challenge, whenever they commit to solve the 
problem. Typically, the police have been slow to respond to a call about mob justice 
thus allowing the perpetrators to disappear and disown the incident. SAPS have only 
shown commitment to quickly respond during sensationalised incidents like the 
xenophobic attacks of 2009 and 2010. 
The researcher brings along this preconception on vigilance as a foundation of 
vigilantism. The word vigilance can be defined broadly to cover awareness and self-
protection against unexpected eventualities whether it is crime, accidents, undue 
influence or material loss. Nonetheless, in this context, vigilantism has taken on new 
forms arising from a community and pledging to uproot household and petty crimes 
such as pick-pocketing, theft, common assaults, delinquency, family disputes, 
indifferences between persons and capital offences like murders, rapes and 
robberies. 
The Diepsloot community has experienced incidents of vigilantism ranging from so 
called disciplining of delinquent community members to eliminating alleged 
troublesome members. Since 2007, the escalation of these incidents has brought 
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serious concern to the community owing to the indiscriminate approach of 
addressing community problems. The fears are intensifying at a rapid rate that the 
total loss of control over crime policing is dawning, thus posing even more threats to 
the community. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
Vigilantism existed even in the pre-1994 era as a vehicle for organising communities 
and restraining residents from collaborating with the apartheid system and to stand 
guard and fight back whenever security agents infiltrated the community. Those who 
were suspected of collaborating with security agents were paraded as examples to 
demonstrate the fatal consequences of being a collaborator. Over time, the vigilante 
tendencies turned towards settling political differences amongst the oppressed. This 
practice remains prevalent to this day. The political intolerance cultivated fearless 
attacks of blacks-on-blacks whereby family relatives would be set against each other 
with pressures at times forcing a member to execute a relative or even a family 
member (Minaar, 2001: 24). 
At the dawn of South African democracy, multiple challenges compelled the new 
administration to roll out many programmes that among others included 
promulgation of laws to establish new communities. As a consequence, yesterday’s 
enemies within communities found themselves sharing the same residential areas. 
Rapid urban migration contributed to this process. The excessive increase of 
informal settlements forced government to off-load certain areas, amidst the broader 
plan of housing every citizen, as a remedy for reducing shacks built on disaster 
prone areas. The off-loading is best illustrated by the establishment of the Diepsloot 
Township. 
Diepsloot is a township in the north of Johannesburg in South Africa. It is a densely 
populated settlement made up of government-subsidised housing, brick houses built 
by land owners, as well as shacks. These shacks are built vacant land that could be 
found. Some land owners charge a rent fee to others to stay in shacks on their land 
(www.alhdc.org.za, 2011: 1). 
Diepsloot, not far from the wealthy suburbs of Dainfern and Chartwell, having been 
established in 1995 as a transit camp for people who had been removed from 
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Zevenfontein. About 1124 plots were made available. People were to stay in the 
transit camp until land became available for new housing. For many this transit camp 
became a permanent home. The Gauteng Provincial Administration, which was then 
a local authority, developed the plots into formal housing stands (www.alhdc.org.za, 
2011: 1). 
Compounding the congestion, in 2001 the Gauteng government moved about 5000 
families to Diepsloot from the banks of Jukskei River in Alexandra. The move was 
intended to decongest and address the need to create a healthy and clean living 
environment in Alexandra. The aim was also to prevent shacks being washed away 
when the river flooded, something that happened year after year. The influx of 
people from Alexandra placed further strain on the already stretched resources of 
Diepsloot. The relocated families did not qualify for housing benefits because the 
area became more congested than had been anticipated by the government. As a 
result, competition over space and resources began a spiralling challenge leading to 
the mushrooming growth shanties in an area where half of the community was 
unemployed. This led to the emergence of social structures that elevated themselves 
to control the beneficiary list and eventually took on the role of local security 
overseers, also coined as popular justice (www.alhdc.org.za, 2011: 1). 
Many researchers argue that vigilante activities are a demonstration of the reduced 
ability of government to perform its responsibilities to combat crime and incarcerating 
convicted criminals. The focus of past research revolves around the incapacity of 
police to deter criminals through visible policing and slow reaction time whenever a 
crime has been reported. Communities became vulnerable and at the mercy of 
criminals. The situation is dire to the extent that people only wish for non-violent 
encounters with criminals since no citizen or area is being spared crime, even in 
correctional facilities.  
Low police capacity implies resources inadequacy, other than personnel, that 
confronts the police service. Reflecting broadly, reaction time can be affected by 
unavailability of vehicles to be dispatched to a crime scene, possibly overstretched 
by multiple incidents and having no standby capacity to react timely. Inaccessibility 
within informal settlement including Diepsloot presents further challenges to crime 
response as a result of poor to no lighting at night, no tarred roads, no streets 
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between shacks, no clear reference point-unnumbered shacks (Minaar, 2002: 24). 
The crime scene combing equipment is often not timely available due to the fact that 
the forensic specialist on standby could not make it quickly to the crime resulting in 
ordinary police officers tampering with some critical evidence. In some situations 
there are police stations without detention facilities presenting a serious challenge 
whenever criminals are apprehended and placed in overcrowded holding cells. 
These incapacities might not have direct impact on the police’s responsibility to 
protect citizens yet this myriad of adverse factors explain the reason why 
hopelessness arise from the public resulting in self-help. 
While poor crime policing is a causal factor of distrust, the justice system also 
contributes to the problem. The problem of case backlogs results in victims losing 
hope of ever finding justice and closure. While the courts are designated to areas as 
per the intensity of legal issues to be attended to by such courts, the reality strikes to 
prove that the crime scourge is not subsiding but rather escalating. Slow 
management of cases and inadequate protection of witnesses often culminate in 
cases either being withdrawn or struck off the roll (Swanepoel, 2004: 38). Since the 
public is not interested in legal intricacies, the only deduction is that the justice 
system has failed them and thus popular justice is justified. The unfortunate 
consequence is the erosion of the societal value of the sanctity of human life. 
The Bill of Rights (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: 1996) stipulates 
that everyone has a right to human dignity, equality and to be free from all forms of 
violence. It further entrenches the right to life thus ending capital punishment (death 
penalty). As a rule, this Bill (Chapter 2 of The Constitution: 1996) continues to 
emphasise the right of everyone, accused of a crime to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty. However, vigilantism shows a total disregard for these fundamental 
rights. Whether it is due to a lack of confidence in criminal justice or a failure of the 
state security apparatus, as reflected by Hoffman (2010: 1), vigilantism is proving to 
be no solution to communities wherein it operates. The following question arises: 
would perpetrators (vigilante agents) readily accept the same fate they bequeath on 
others? The reality is the communities live in fear of them. 
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1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Diepsloot is home to thousands of families many of which live in shacks and struggle 
a livelihood. The unemployment rate is measured at 51% of the Diepsloot 
community. As a result of unemployment and congestion, the area has become a 
preying ground for criminal elements which led to the community organising itself for 
protection in order to eliminate criminals preying on the poor. (www.diepsloot.com, 
2012: 1). 
Vigilantism is prevalent in Diepsloot to the extent of threatening the community it 
intends to protect. Recent developments, especially since xenophobic attacks, show 
an increase in incidents of vigilantism thus causing the community to live in fear of 
this misguided self-sufficient security instrument. There has not been any formal 
research conducted to determine the effects of vigilantism on the local community 
and the measures to curb vigilantism. The effects intend to address the impact of 
vigilante activities on the socio-moral fibre of the community which tends to breed a 
violent society and undermine the sanctity of life. Therefore, there is a need to 
conduct formal research on how vigilantism affects the community of Diepsloot.  
1.4 PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to explore and determine the effect of vigilantism in 
Diepsloot and propose measures to neutralise the increase of vigilantism in 
Diepsloot. It is often ignored that communities sharing common challenges have 
more cohesive drivers than self-sufficient and resourced communities. As a result, 
common tendencies tend to be perceived as indicators of a common identity thus 
vigilante incidents are typically embraced as heroic acts with the effect of making 
vigilantism into acceptable behaviour. In the process of the study, the researcher 
aims to ascertain the attitude of the Diepsloot community towards vigilantism and the 
criminal justice system. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The questions that need to be answered by this research are: 
What are the effects of vigilantism to the Diepsloot community? 
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 What is the community perception of vigilante incidents?  
 Are vigilante attacks the norm? 
 What criteria are used when mob justice is meted out? 






















According to Creswell (2003: 29) the literature review in research study 
accomplishes several purposes. It shares with the reader the results of other studies 
that are closely related to the study under focus. This chapter aims to highlight the 
existing knowledge on vigilantism and extend the viewpoints beyond what has been 
presented by previous researchers or writers. The literature review will be used as a 
framework in analysing arguments on the topic in order to support logical 
conclusions. 
This chapter presents the conceptual clarity underlying vigilantism and its 
dichotomies. It will also provide a retrospective perspective of this activity with brief 
indicators and look at vigilantism beyond Diepsloot, as a geographic location. The 
review pays attention to the extent to which vigilantism has become a major concern 
to authorities and communities. 
Much has been written on vigilantism since the emergence of the Limpopo-based 
Mapogo-a-Mathamaga (Mapogo), the Cape Town-based People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), Amafelandawonye in the Eastern Cape, etc. 
These organisations brought about a euphoria supporting self-help or popular justice 
that spiralled into unrest and instability that required the government to introduce 
specific programmes to silence and uproot these organisations. However, various 
forms of popular justice remain a well-established approach in many communities in 
South Africa both in the formal and informal settlements. What one is likely to 
observe in middle-income and affluent suburbs is the typical neighbourhood watch 
strongly comprising of one or all of the following elements; private security 
companies, street surveillance cameras, registered community policing forums and 
sector patrol vehicles designated by the SAPS. Meanwhile, lower-income and no-
income settlements which cannot afford any of the above are restricted to 
neighbourhood watches based on street patrols in the night and alert systems should 
there be any criminal activity taking place (Gottschalk, 2005: 2).  
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The former settlement setup (affording groups) allows coordinated deterrence of 
criminal elements and the apprehension of criminals with the intention to hand them 
over to the police, yet assault is often meted out and in some cases though seldom 
result in fatal injuries. In the contrast, the latter communities are confronted by the 
scourge of crime which takes away their few hard-earned assets and infringe on 
personal security, which is often seen as the individual’s responsibility rather than 
government’s task. This view that middle and business class suburbanites respond 
to crime by paying for burglar alarms and paying fees to security companies for 
armed response and bicycle patrols is attested by Gottschalk (2005: 2). The working 
class townships and shantytowns have time rather than money, especially the 
unemployed, and form neighbourhood watches, which can swiftly degenerate into 
vigilantism. 
2.2 CONCEPT CLARITY 
The state is regarded by citizens as having the responsibility to administer public 
safety and justice at all times in order to manage and referee constant tensions and 
competition for resources. This view is traditional to the times when state security 
automatically translated to the security of the individual. However, the dynamisms 
brought about by rapid development twisted this view through the complex 
expectations and demands arising from the population and assets. It is this 
development that changed the concept of state security to human security thus 
engraving the principles of public safety and justice. 
Public safety and justice aim to assure individuals in the citizenry that they have 
freedom from fear and fairness of arbitration whenever one has been violated. Safety 
and justice are equally functions of the state where the demand always exceeds the 
supply. Crime statistics remain stubbornly high year on year. The institutions 
assigned the responsibility to administer justice are equally choking to the degree 
that the state tends to be seen as non-functional. 
The perception that the state is failing in this responsibility brings the justification for 
self-service therefore providing a good business platform for the non-state actors. 
The non-state actors bring to the people the hope that whilst the state is grappling 
with other contending social demands, the individual security is not compromised. 
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Hope and desire for justice has fuelled the growth of a myriad of organisations, 
groupings, companies and individuals in big numbers. 
There is a popular belief among development professionals that non-state, local 
justice and security networks are more effective, accountable, efficient, legitimate 
and accessible than the institutions of the state. Thus, these actors are 
indispensable for achieving justice and security (Scheye. 2009: 7). 
Non‐state actors are those actors that provide security and justice without a state 
mandate (Derk, 2012: 15). Albrecht and Kyed (2010: 1) argue that the efficiency of 
state institutions for security and justice depends on the shape of the local needs 
and the level of collaboration with local non-state actors. They further highlight that 
these actors include traditional or customary authorities; community based policing 
groups, restorative justice, mediation organisations and work associations. Indeed, 
the level of local involvement by the non-state actors creates the context for the 
buying-in by the state to forge an integrated approach towards public safety and 
justice. The concept of non-state is often used to define a range of actors including 
representatives of village governance institutions. The use of the term differentiates 
these actors from government and formal justice sector institutions (Zurstrassen, 
2011:113). Somehow, the local needs are not always founded on the absence or 
insufficient state supply of these services. The traditional authorities and community 
policing groups are often in conflict over target areas and authority thus creating 
space for criminal groupings to develop. 
Scheye (2009: 7) reflects on non-state actors as the “second state”. He refers 
broadly to actors rendering various services like health, education, electricity, 
economic opportunity, justice and safety. He further covers a spectrum of actors to 
include secret societies, businessmen, chiefs, the military and warlords. Scheye 
does not differ from Albrecht and Kyed in his description, thus, chiefs would be 
considered as traditional and customary authorities. However, the inclusion of 
warlords does distort the concept of non-state actors as their foundation lacks a 
foundation in societal values, thus, local interests would be subdued and vigilante 
activities would kick in. 
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Public safety involves the policing of the criminal and other reprehensible activities 
upsetting the communities. Baker (2010: 208) shares in the description of non-state 
actors by indicating that the term applies to a wide range of local collectives 
providing everyday policing and may include customary leaders, religious 
organisations, ethnic associations, youth groups, work-based associations, 
community police forums, conflict resolution non-governmental organisations, the 
lowest and informal levels of local government and entrepreneurs. Baker further 
distinguishes the concept from international context to African perspective. In Africa, 
the examples include vigilance groups by private citizens, religious police by Islamic 
groups or political leaders in community to police moral conduct, clan militia for the 
protection of cultural web, civil defence forces providing security within their area of 
operation, semi-commercial anti-crime units for asset protection, work-based security 
groups for the benefit of trading communities, customary structures for the chief 
intervention efforts and restorative justice community-based organisation to manage 
disputes within communities. 
Vigilantism, from a personal view, can be described as a practice by individuals or 
organised groups focused on self-protection against any threats to self or personal 
assets. This description would be short circuited if one excludes the contextual 
foundation of the concept. Vigilantism, as a word, is derived from the word vigilance 
which implies one’s ability to be conscious of their surrounding and alert to avert 
possible threats whether physical or verbal (i.e. insults). Vigilance is a positive 
attribute that is embedded in people even animals as a precautionary instinct from 
falling prey to others. 
Sekhonyane and Louw (2002: 24) picked the following definition from Encyclopaedia 
Americana, 1985, “vigilantes was a name given to self-appointed law enforcement 
groups which appeared occasionally in older communities where law officers and 
courts were non-existent, inefficient or corrupt; where municipal institutions were 
disorganised; or where established authorities seems unable to cope with 
lawlessness and disorder”. Furthermore, Nina (2001: 10), in concurrence with 
Sekhonyane and Louw, quotes Johnston who describes vigilantism as “the result of 
broken trust in the ability of state agencies to protect its people thus becoming a 
reaction to real or perceived deviance”. This reaction distinguishes vigilantism from 
mere established violence. 
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The above descriptions, by the cited authors, carry one common denominator of self-
help thus attesting to the common description highlighted in the paragraph preceding 
the above. Of importance is that the spirit of disregard to authority tends to prevail 
therefore giving orchestrators the impression of impunity and satisfaction of just acts 
that culminate into self-praise and heroism. The one significant question would be 
whether these descriptions cover all aspects and characteristics of vigilantism? 
Minaar (2001: 4) contributed to the definition through reference to the Oxford English 
Dictionary relating vigilante as a member of a vigilante committee, a committee that 
is self-appointed for the maintenance of justice and order in an imperfectly organised 
community. He, however, goes further to argue the incompleteness of this definition 
in view of the ferociousness encompassed in vigilante incidents to less instead of 
more justice and order. It is in this reference that a reminder is driven home to prove 
that vigilantism does not solve the crime in communities but is virtually the crime in 
itself and is instead holding its own community hostage. 
Vigilantism is described as social movements that give rise to premeditated acts of 
force and corporal punishment or the threat to use violence or corporal punishment. 
It further involves activities that arise as a reaction to transgression of relatively well-
established, sometimes institutionalised, norms. Again, it is the acts that are focused 
upon a crime and or social control in the form of providing security to participants 
and members of established orders (Buur and Jensen, 2004: 141). Therefore, 
vigilantes are groups and individuals that are constituted outside legal frameworks 
enforced by the state. 
From these definitions, the term vigilantism embodies different labels that are 
commonly used to refer to the same thing (vigilantism). Thus, the use of terms like; 
mob justice, popular justice, violent justice and vigilante activities would be implying 
vigilantism. Indeed the understanding of vigilantism is synchronised around its traits 
and all writers converge around the common denominator. 
2.3 THE VASTNESS OF VIGILANTISM 
Vigilantism is not unique to South Africa and does not differ in tradecraft. Like the 
military profession, vigilante actions share common traits and drills regardless of 
geographic space or cultural identity. Several studies have reflected on incidents of 
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vigilantism in the world, however, there is no consolidated studies conducted that 
reflect the vastness of vigilantism. Nonetheless, there are existing reflections on 
individual countries in the broader security complexes.  
Kempa and Shearing (2002) conducted a comparative study between South Africa 
and Northern Ireland on non-state formations. While the South African scenario 
presents examples of bona fide community formations for vigilantism, in Northern 
Ireland vigilantism emerged differently, for example, the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
was created as a substructure of the police and later evolved into a vigilante group 
fighting on one side of the historic feud between Catholics and Protestants. The 
structure was then dismantled and members were investigated. The system was 
replaced with District Community Policing Partnership Boards similar to the South 
African Community Policing Forum. Beaulieu (2007: 21) writes on the atrocities 
committed by the Minutemen in Texas observing that Minutemen feel autonomous 
and supplementing to the state machinery. Thus, the Minutemen continue to exist 
with impunity. An attempt has been made to look at the effects of vigilantism through 
Global Burden of Armed Violence (2011: 2) yet it is convoluted by statistics of deaths 
caused by other violence, rather than vigilantism alone. In its reflection, the 
challenge of vigilante justice continues unabated with impunity in Liberia and East 
Timor. 
The link between narcotics and vigilantism has been observed in two countries in 
Southern Africa, namely Mauritius and South Africa. Vigilante groupings, ostensibly 
inspired by religious fanaticism, have been able to mobilise around opposition to 
narcotics trafficking and mounted a campaign of violent acts against those perceived 
to be involved. In Mauritius the Hezbollah party took a tough line against drugs, 
committing acts of murder and lawlessness. The leadership of the party has since 
been apprehended and jailed, ending the spate of atrocities committed during its 
tenure. The activities of PAGAD in South Africa were premised on certain religious 
principles. They resulted in many deaths and much destruction of property, until the 
authorities stepped in decisively (Goredema, 2005: 3). 
The questions that concern law-conscious and law-abiding citizen will always be 
whether mob justice deters crime and what are the authorities doing in response? Is 
Diepsloot unique and how widespread is this horrendous trend? Whilst these 
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questions are not the focal point of this research, they remain pertinent to much of 
the research conducted on this matter. Vigilantism is not limited to Diepsloot alone 
but spread sporadically across South Africa (prevalent, but not exclusively, in 
Gauteng, Limpopo, Western Cape and Eastern Cape). Therefore, it can be deduced 
that scientific research that demonstrates the negative effect of violent justice would 
prove that vigilantism is not the ideal solution for crimes in communities. 
Critical to the deterrence of vigilantism is the ability of any preventative measure to 
reduce and eradicate crime. Vigilantes should acknowledge that their actions are not 
helping combat crime but are socialising communities into further violent behaviour 
creating a context in which the ease of killing a person does not increase moral 
outrage. Since many vigilante members go unpunished the message of “crime does 
not pay”, is undermined by the societal elevation of those at the lead of this popular 
justice (Sekhonyane, 2000: 21). Given the knowledge of the criminal nature of 
vigilantism, “mafia” tactics become the doctrine through which intimidation of the 
society to discourage people from assisting authorities becomes. This means that 
whilst many writers give focus on state capability to render effective security and 
criminal justice, yet the grey area of seriously concealed evidence continue to defeat 
the ability of institutions like SAPS to conquer and arrest the vigilante tendency. 
Buur and Jensen (2004:144) emphasise that beyond the mistrust between the state 
and its citizens, there lies an implicit incapacity and complicity by law enforcement to 
address vigilantism which prompts the copycat style from one location to another. 
This mistrust and complicity reinforces the relevance of vigilantism to these 
groupings and perpetual renegotiation of boundaries becomes a norm. As a result, a 
moral dilemma emanates from the condoning of violence, as prescribed by vigilante 
formations and the exposure of kids to impulsive reaction to problems, and new 
standards are set as the best solution for societal problems. This is founded on the 
typical non-exclusive attendance of vigilante brutalities by people of different ages 
including children. 
2.4 TRAITS DEFINING VIGILANTISM 
Sekhonyane (2000: 21): sums up the common traits of vigilante acts as follows: 
 Punishment that often exceeds the crime allegedly committed. 
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 Engaging in illegal acts such as kidnappings, crimen injuria, malicious 
damage to property, theft, robbery and sabotage. 
 Alleged perpetrators being accosted by highly charged mobs. 
 Acts of severe violence including the serious assault and murder of alleged 
criminals. 
 The lack of a clear structure, rules and limitations in the way the vigilante 
organisation operates. 
 The absence of communication lines between the groups and state organs 
such as the police. 
Maepa (2001: 21) also made additions to these characteristics as follows:  
 Acts are carried out in public. 
 Fear and control are generated through repression. 
 They are based on a model of instant, retributive justice and oppositional to 
the rehabilitative method as prescribed by the South African justice system. 
Minaar (2004) re-enforces these traits with the following: 
 Spontaneous mob-style emotive reaction to a situation often involving 
immediate punishment. 
 Once-off-street gathering dispensing ad hoc and summary justice. 
 Caught-in-the-act citizen response. 
With these traits, the victims, in the form of accused persons, prefer to be arrested 
rather than being punished by the mob. The punishment meted out by the vigilante 
ranges from excessive lashing to death. This pressurises the communities to submit 
and endorse the might and legitimacy of the formations because any form of 
dissidence may be countered with the same brutality. This tendency qualifies the 
question, are communities condoning this form of punishment? Logically, no parent 
would endorse this form of brutality when there are no guarantees that your family 
would not fall prey in future. This is attested by an extract from Sekhonyane and 
Louw (2002: 26) quoting Mr Thomas Moeng of the Diepsloot branch of Mapogo-a-
Mathamaga in February 2001: We find a friend of the suspect and plead with him to 
tell us where his friend is or the loot is. If he refuses, we give him a taste of the 
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medicine. After tasting the medicine he will confess. Then we give him more lashes 
for lying or trying to hide a friend. When we find the friend and he confesses to the 
crime and hands over the loot, we give him lashes too. With this approach anyone 
could fall a victim to false accusation from someone who is trying to escape the 
bitterness of this medicine. The unfortunate eventuality is that there is no recourse 
even if you were lashed for being friend to a criminal thus presenting the vengeance 
as a balance for the incurred injuries. 
2.5 THE SPREAD OF VIGILANTISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
By 2008, the ANC government had built more than a million township households, 
provided water for well over nine million people and given access to electricity for 
millions of households by redirecting social spending previously allocated to the 
chosen few (Buur, 2008: 3). The flip-side of these achievements is the fact that low-
income black households are still trapped geographically on the peripheries of the 
economically vibrant cities. It is in these localities where the socio-economic 
conditions are appalling to the extent that the people simply cannot pay for the 
services that are intended to improve their lives. 
Recent studies of vigilantism in South Africa have suggested that it has emerged as 
a result of soaring crime rates and the state’s failure to enforce its own laws. Many 
analysts of non-state actors argue that vigilantism is triggered when the government 
fails to police and protect its citizens (Dixon & Johns, 2001). It is this outcome that 
catalyses the resolution of communities, that had been socialised with state-
engineered violence, to resort to self-protection. The problem seen from mainstream 
perspectives on vigilantism is that the law has not been applied either consistently or 
coherently. 
By 2009 and 2010, some 5% of reported murders (one in 20) were the result of 
vigilante violence or self-help against crime. 2011 has seen an increase in the killing 
of suspected criminals by the ‘necklace’ method. In the period under review, the 
upsurge in necklacing began in June 2011 in New Brighton (Port Elizabeth), after 
two young men broke into the home of an elderly woman, stole her television, and 
stabbed her tenant to death. Nosipho Magaqa, a New Brighton resident pronounced 
that: We are tired of these criminals. The system protects the criminals more than 
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the victims of crime, so we will mete out our own justice. Another angry woman 
added: Even if criminals are arrested today, tomorrow you will see them walking the 
street. Enough is enough. We are going back to the tyre (Jeffery, 2012: 21). 
There were four more necklacing incidents in Port Elizabeth afterwards, followed by 
three others in the Free State, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal respectively. Since 
January 2012, a further nine necklacing incidents have taken place in Khayelitsha 
(Cape Town). Residents blamed the ineffective police, claiming that mob justice is 
the only permanent solution to brazen criminality. This led to the Premier of Western 
Cape, Ms Zille, establishing a commission of inquiry into vigilante killings and other 
violence in the area, in August 2012 (Jeffery, 2012: 21). 
Buur (2008: 573) presents a fundamental view on the moral-ethical contestation 
between state and vigilante tendencies. According to Buur, vigilantism is not a 
critique of the application of the law, but of the moral and ethical foundations of the 
law itself. In South Africa, vigilantism can be seen as a response to, and thus a site 
of struggle and negotiation over, the attempt to enshrine human rights as a 
foundational value, where many communities see vigilantes as their protection 
against crime. Pre-1994 violence conditioned many communities to be open to 
vigilantism. 
2.5.1 EASTERN CAPE 
Port Elizabeth 
The new dispensation with the Constitution presenting an avalanche of individual 
rights brought with it some contestation. Many of the common and accepted 
disciplinary measures were curtailed by the new rights discourse. The contradiction 
between the wider socio-economic transformation and more traditional methods of 
socialisation and asserting authority became bulls sharing a kraal. In this context, the 
vigilante formations provided an alternative. Parents who could no longer physically 
discipline youngsters turned to vigilante formations instead of the previous practice 
when they used to turn to the police in the townships. This was particularly the case 
with grandparents who were no longer able to exercise disciplinary power over the 
grandchildren for whom they were responsible (Buur, 2008: 578). 
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The obliteration of corporal punishment and the fear of accusations of domestic 
violence have driven parents to invoke local law enforcers who know how to 
discipline in a manner that does not make the punishment visible. Buur (2008: 578) 
reflected on the dynamics of adaptation to the changes of socio-cultural times. The 
dynamics involved the retention of traditions whilst not violating new laws through 
imitation, overlapping and supporting the changes. The result is the production of 
local ways of being a person of articulating a moral community that cannot be 
captured by the sources and means available to the formal authorities. 
Vigilante attacks were prevalent in Kwazakele around 1999 and directed at fighting 
crime. Buur (2008: 579) further relates excessively violent acts committed by a group 
of young, armed criminals, many of whom had served prison sentences and were 
part of the prison gangs known as the 26s, 27s and 28s which terrorised Kwazakele. 
A group of criminals broke into an elderly couple’s house, stole a television and 
radio, cutlery, videos, clothes and shot the old woman dead when she tried to 
prevent them from raping her daughter. In the community’s eyes, the police were too 
busy chasing black thieves in Port Elizabeth’s white suburbs to bother about an 
elderly black couple’s belongings in the township. 
To confront the criminals, a group of old men called a group of trusted former Young 
Lions (ex-combatants of MK), most of whom were unemployed. Their idea was that 
safety needed to be restored. If crime could happen to their neighbours, it could also 
happen to their own families. The Lions managed to track down one of the criminals 
and forced him to reveal the identity of his accomplices. They managed to capture 
the whole group within a week, except for the leader, whom they apprehended three 
months later (Buur, 2008: 579). 
To the community’s great dissatisfaction, the criminals were released from prison a 
week later and continued their activities. The police did not like the Lions’ methods 
and tried to arrest some of the members. A group of elders (all men), led by a 
prominent ANC member, a former Robben Island prison mate of Nelson Mandela 
himself, called a public meeting at the local primary school in order to prevent the 
arrest of the Lions, which threatened to rob the community of its protectors. At that 
meeting, twelve of the most trusted young men were elected as the community’s 
Concerned Residents Against Crime (Buur, 2008: 580). 
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The rules laid down for their work in the community were simple: be as harsh with 
the criminals as is necessary to make them speak, but do it discreetly so that you do 
not get into trouble with the police. This rule was contravening the Constitution’s 
insistence on respect for the right of all human beings to be free from all forms of 
violence (Paragraph 12(1c). Where the Constitution protects all human beings, the 
law of the community obviously does not. Thus, the Constitution presented the 
young crime fighters with a moral dilemma: they are expected to act in ways that are 
forbidden, even criminalised, but which the community concerned sees as both 
acceptable and desirable within the moral code of the township (Buur, 2008: 581). 
Shifting focus from the Young Lions of 1999 to 2012, South African townships have 
been rocked by incidents of necklacing, mob-justice punishment, in which tyres are 
forced over victims' shoulders and set alight. In more recent times, the difference is 
that formations that would qualify the classification of vigilantism have taken new 
identity. The question asked was; is this notorious form of killing from the 1980s 
making a comeback? 
The Port Elizabeth incidents and a number of others elsewhere in the Eastern Cape 
province in June and July 2012 have raised fears that necklacing is returning as the 
most extreme form of a rising tide of vigilante justice. Angelina Maholwana, 74, felt 
that justice was being done as she watched two young men burn to death. Tyres had 
been forced over their shoulders, doused in petrol and set alight. She had identified 
Mabhutana Siwisa, 19, and Mloza Gqomfa, 20, as the men who had broken into her 
home, killed her son, tried to sexually assault her and stolen their belongings. It was 
the fourth incident of necklacing in one month, in New Brighton, Port Elizabeth 
(www.whatishappeninginsouthafrica.blogspot.com, 2012: 1). 
The 2011 police statistics show that of the 46 killings committed on an average day 
in South Africa, 5% were due to vigilantism. Beating and stoning are two of the most 
common ways the killings are carried out. Many people in poor communities like 
New Brighton township have lost faith in the police and see vigilantism as the best 
way of keeping the streets safe (Whatishappeninginsouthafrica.blogspot.com, 2012: 
1). This is attested by one resident, Sicelo Lucas: Mob justice is not right but it has 
its place in our society. He concerted that vigilantism does reduce crime and people 
are scared because they know the community will rise up against them. However 
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there is fear brewing at the same time. Sicelo further stated that Some do worry, 
however, about the risk of the innocent being punished for crimes they did not 
commit. Mob justice is wrong because sometimes the wrong people get punished. 
(Whatishappeninginsouthafrica.blogspot.com, 2012: 2). 
Eastern Cape, like Western Cape, had an organisation called People Against Drugs 
and Violence (PADAV). This organisation was a replica of PAGAD. There were no 
reports that PADAV, killed persons during the year 2000 and 2001; however, cases 
between 2001 and 2003 were continuing. PADAV similarly was an Islamic-oriented, 
community-based organisation with a mandate calling for stronger action against 
crime and drugs. (South Africa Human Rights Report, 2004: 3). 
2.5.2 WESTERN CAPE 
Cape Town 
PAGAD originated in a network of hitherto disparate and isolated anti-drug, anti-
crime groups and neighbourhood watches frustrated by their inability to tackle 
problems whose roots extended far beyond their individual localities. Predominantly, 
but by no means exclusively Muslim, PAGAD began with a loose organisational 
structure and an informal, collective style of leadership. It was open to approaches 
from other anti-crime groups and prepared at least to consider working with the 
police. Many of the more violent actions taken against drug dealers, such as the 
attack on Rashaad Staggie in August 1996, were neither planned nor formally 
sanctioned by the organisation as a whole (Dixon and Johns, 2001: 4). 
From a popular anti-crime movement it has become first a violent, and therefore 
illegitimate, vigilante organisation and then, since 1998, an urban terror group 
threatening not just the State's monopoly on the use of coercive force but the very 
foundations of constitutional democracy. In line with these altered perceptions, the 
State's response to PAGAD changed from constructive engagement with it to 
demonisation and repression (Dixon and Johns, 2001: 4). 
Bombings and shootings have continued beyond the year 2000. Government 
ministers have been quick to blame PAGAD for attacks that include the shooting of 
Wynberg magistrate, Pieter Theron and the bombing of targets in Constantia, 
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Gatesville, Observatory and central Cape Town. It is impossible either to prove or 
disprove such claims on the basis of this research (Dixon and Johns, 2001: 5). 
Respondents to Dixon and Johns, during their research, offered many different 
explanations for the continuing violence (ranging from the assassination of leading 
gangsters to the bombing of the Planet Hollywood and St Elmo's restaurants), as 
well as to who was behind it and what the motivation of the perpetrators might have 
been. Among those held responsible were gangsters settling old scores or fighting 
for new turf, rogue elements connected to the security forces seeking to undermine 
the credibility of national or provincial government, and anti-gang militants (Dixon 
and Johns, 2001: 5). 
Gugulethu 
Between 1990 and 1995 Gugulethu, a township in Cape Town, was seen as a model 
for popular justice activities. This coincided with the direct intervention of external 
assistance to the community. However, external assistance diminished and 
Gugulethu’s community elements of popular justice developed their own course. 
Since 1996, external help to the community, provided by NGOs to assist in the 
process of developing organs of popular justice, decreased. This was probably 
because of decreases in international funding for such activities (Nina, 2000: 10). 
It is in light of this history that the phenomenon of mob justice in Gugulethu needed 
to be analysed from August 1998 when the Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association 
(CATA) took action against criminals. For example, alleged rapists, murderers, 
burglars, and thieves were being physically assaulted and paraded naked down the 
streets of Gugulethu (Nina, 2000: 10). 
The community appointed its own representatives to deal with the problem of crime, 
during a period when the police had no credibility among members of the 
community. In August and September 1998, during the period of vigilante action, the 
area’s police station was first closed and then reopened. A number of its police 
officers were deployed to other areas (Nina, 2000: 10). Then there was a lull in 
vigilantism until recently when mob justice resurfaced. 
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A man accused of stealing a stove was beaten to death in an incident of vigilante 
violence on 17 December 2012 in KTC, Nyanga. Malibongwe Lugala, 35, from 
Gugulethu NY3, was allegedly killed by four residents of Nyanga. According to 
Lugala’s friend and an eyewitness to the incident, he and two other friends were 
walking with Lugala in search of a cigarette when five men from KTC called Lugala. 
We were four. When these men called Lugalo he stopped and we continue with our 
journey. When we came back these men were beating him (Lugalo). I tried to stop 
them and asked what was happening but they pushed me away. They grabbed him 
(Lugalo), he was kicking trying to escape. I asked them why they are beating Lugalo 
but they did not reply, they just told me to stay out of it. I asked one of my friends to 
go to Lugalo’s place while I was looking for a police van, but was not able to find help 
in time. According to residents Lugalo was accused of stealing a stove from a local 
shop in the area. However, no one presented or questioned about when the stove 
was stolen (Damba, 2012: 1). 
Khayelitsha 
Khayelitsha has placed itself in the country’s map to be as famous as Soweto, 
except famous for the highest crime rate in the country. It is generally conceded that 
the rights to human dignity, life and freedom and security of the person are trampled 
on daily because of the failures of the criminal justice system. Crime continues to 
increase in Khayelitsha and its criminal justice system is in crisis with more than 300 
murders in 2010. The rates of sexual assault and violent crime including murder and 
assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm have increased dramatically. The 
true scale of crime is hard to know as many crimes are heavily underreported 
(Bregman, 2011: 1). 
The criminal justice system is said to have been paralysed by numerous failures. 
These include: lost dockets, corruption, poor investigation, escaped suspects, the 
state not opposing bail for accused standing trial for serious crimes, mistreatment of 
victims, a failure to inform families of updates relating to their cases, years-long 
forensic backlogs and endless postponements that see cases taking years to be 
resolved, are barriers to the effective delivery of justice and safety (Bregman, 2011: 
1). 
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A resident accused of stealing money had been beaten by four men with bricks and 
hit with one of their cars. The man managed to flee to a nearby primary school. The 
police, whom he had alerted, arrived and did not make any arrests but left (John, 
2012: 1). This was reported to Mail and Guardian newspaper by a researcher from 
the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) stationed in Khayelitsha in 2012. 
The attack was part of a surge in mob justice in the township, where at least 18 
vigilante mob killings have happened in the last 10 months. The coalition says 
residents have lost faith in the police to keep them safe and in desperation are taking 
the law into their own hands. There has also been a new problem plaguing the 
township, the rise in teen gang violence (John, 2012: 1). 
The police’s deviation from law enforcement and or apprehension of law breakers 
has been observed in the recent past. John, (2012: 1) wrote about an incident on 
one Tuesday night at around 8.30pm. The SJC member was watching television in 
his Green Point home, when he heard three gunshots. He followed a police vehicle 
down the road to an open field across which about 10 teens were fleeing. Two 
policemen got out of the van, grabbed one of the boys and started beating him with 
water pipes. He managed to run for a few metres but they caught him and beat him 
again. 
Likhona Njamela, an SJC volunteer, said she and a group of Green Point residents 
watched police beat teenage gang members with water pipes when they would not 
leave the area on Friday night. They wanted to beat everyone who was on the 
scene. We told them 'no guys, you can't do this. The residents were angry and 
started throwing stones at the police van (John, 2012: 1). 
2.5.3 KWAZULU-NATAL 
Vigilante actions have not spared KwaZulu-Natal but continued around 2004. The 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported that mob justice was an increasing 
problem, although no figures were available. In May 2004, a mob stoned to death 
two youths accused of terrorizing community members in Chesterville, outside 
Durban. On July 27, a mob attacked, set alight and killed three young men from 
Inanda; police arrested five suspects in connection with the incident. In some of the 
incidents, between 50 and 100 community members were involved in the attacks. On 
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July 27, approximately 50 persons participated in the hacking and necklacing of the 
three men, who allegedly were involved in criminal activities in Kwa Mashu, north of 
Durban (South Africa Human Rights Report, 2004: 4). 
2.5.4 GAUTENG 
Around 2001, Gauteng townships were contesting for attention on mob justice. In a 
week, four people were killed in vigilante attacks in Soweto and a 19-year-old man 
was attacked in Orange Farm but was saved from another mob attack after being 
accused of armed robbery. Freelance photographer, who led Kinos Hlatshwayo's 
dramatic rescue, said the mob was threatening to necklace the suspect. She said the 
crowd’s anger increased after police took more than an hour to arrive at the scene of 
the crime. Community members became highly agitated when the police failed to 
arrive at the scene and then decided to make plans and set his body on fire. The 
mob had already made plans to buy petrol, while a tyre was put next to his body 
(Ndaba, 2001: 1). 
The witness had earlier phoned the Orange Farm police station to tell them of the 
mob attack, but the police did not initially respond (Ndaba, 2001: 1). The victim was 
eventually saved when a police unit on a routine patrol drove into the area. 
In Pimville, three young men were murdered for breaking into a church and stealing 
chairs. The community had threatened to resort to the necklace in dealing with 
criminals. The three, whose ages were estimated at between 17 and 22, were found 
dead in the middle of a soccer field in Pimville Zone 3, opposite the church where 
they had allegedly broken in and stolen 20 chairs (Makgalemele, 2001: 1). 
The community has been plagued by robberies, rapes and break-ins. The three 
suspected criminals were beaten up and stoned to death. Their naked bodies were 
found by the police the next day. Three others escaped across the railway line. 
Another member of the group, a girl, was critically assaulted (Makgalemele, 2001: 1). 
According to the church caretaker, a woman who lives opposite the church heard 
noises coming from the church and blew a whistle to alert residents. They came 
running and pursued the suspects. 
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2.6 THE 2007/8 XENOPHOBIC VIOLENCE 
Xenophobia was and still is touted as the reason that led to a number of violent 
attacks on foreigners. In September 2001, Catholic social workers in Cape Town 
claimed that xenophobia was a major contributing factor in the deaths of as many as 
28 refugees during an 18-month period. At end of 2002, detectives were 
investigating the case of three Angolans and one citizen killed in January 2002 in 
clashes between locals and refugees in the Joe Slovo area in Milnerton in Cape 
Town (South Africa Human Rights Report, 2004: 3). 
The Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) disputed 
former Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula’s statement that the wave of 
violent xenophobic attacks did not constitute a crisis. Nqakula was quoted as stating: 
It is only a problem, but if it were a crisis, it would be happening right across the 
country. CoRMSA argued that the incidents of mob violence targeting non-nationals 
have taken place in every province in the country including 14 major incidents in 
different provinces from September 2007. According to CoRMSA, this was in fact a 
national crisis requiring urgent attention at the most senior level of government. 
Since the attacks in Alexandra, there have been new attacks in Diepsloot and 
Olifantsfontein, in Gauteng (CoRMSA, 2008: 1). 
Many of the incidents of mob violence targeting non-nationals have taken place in 
areas where there is a poor level of service delivery and a low level of law 
enforcement. It is also clear that there is a lack of trust in formal conflict resolution 
structures such as local ward councillors to be able to resolve the communities’ 
grievances hence the perception that such vigilante action is necessary (CoRMSA, 
2008: 2). 
XENOPHOBIC ATTACK SITES 2007-2008 
PLACE TIMELINE 
Delmas, Mpumalanga September 2007 
Mooiplaas, Gauteng December 2007 
Hebron, North West December 2007 
Plastic View, Gauteng December 2007 
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Soshanguve, Gauteng December 2007 
Jeffrey's Bay, Eastern Cape January 2008 
Kroonstad, Free State February 2008 
Valhalla Park, Western Cape February 2008 
Itireleng, Gauteng February 2008 
Atteridgeville, Gauteng March 2008 
Klipgat, North West March 2008 
Worcester, Western Cape March 2008 
Mamelodi, Gauteng April 2008 
Alexandra, Gauteng May 2008 
Diepsloot, Gauteng May 2008 
Olifantsfontein, Gauteng May 2008 
 
The nationwide wave of attacks on foreigners in May 2008 resulted in 62 persons 
killed, of whom 21 were South Africans, 11 Mozambican, five Zimbabwean, and 
three Somali. Twenty-two bodies were never identified. It is generally acknowledged 
that the nationwide spate of violence against foreigners, which began on 11 May 
2008 and lasted for approximately two weeks, began during a community meeting in 
a township near Johannesburg (Country Advice South Africa, 2010: 2). 
2.7 THE VIGILANTISM SITUATION IN DIEPSLOOT 
The media has reported extensively on vigilante attacks in Diepsloot highlighting the 
seriousness of the problem. The following are the examples: 
Swanepoel (2008: 222) indicated that in 1997, a people’s court was established in 
Extension 1, Diepsloot and within a month, ten people had fallen victim to vigilante 
attacks. 
Mbulelo Musi as quoted by Swanepoel (2008: 222) made a media statement from 
the Provincial Ministry of Safety and Security in Gauteng on 14 June 1998 that Three 
people are reported to have been killed when a mob took the law into its own hands 
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in Diepsloot following an alleged attempt by the three to commit robbery in a 
shebeen in the area. The police are investigating the matter. 
Farai Kujirichita, 26, was clubbed to death in Diepsloot on 22 January 2011 and his 
final moments were captured on a video. Farai was still alive when one of the men 
methodically destroyed his face and skull with a heavy wooden plank. He was 
probably dead or dying when another man grasped his belt and punched him 
repeatedly in the groin and a grinning teenage girl raised a large chunk of cement 
above her head. Farai’s crime was that he was a Zimbabwean in the wrong place at 
the wrong time (Mtika, 2011: 1). 
Mtika (2011: 1) asserted that in Diepsloot, the killings continue unabated. In a 
different incident, two Zimbabweans were kicked and beaten to death after being 
accused of robbery. Another incident is of a suspected thief who narrowly escaped 
with his life when police arrived just in time to prevent a mob from killing him. The 
police should have given him to us. We know what to do with people like him. We will 
continue to kill tsotsis. The police are always called out to attend to these attacks. 
Warrant Officer Mavimbela stated that: People here take the law into their own 
hands. All too often foreigners are the targets of their rage. 
Freelance journalist, Golden Mtika, witnessed Farai’s murder and I have witnessed 
more than 300 mob justice cases, but that one is the scariest Mtika recounted. Even 
children have become desensitised to the violence around them, Mtika said. They 
could be playing soccer on a field and there would be a dead body next to them and 
they wouldn’t be bothered. According to Mtika Diepsloot residents don’t ask 
questions when someone is accused of a crime. Mob justice is the people’s way of 
dealing with criminals because they don’t feel protected by the police. It is so 
common that people get necklaced almost every week (Mtika, 2011: 1). 
Led by a 15 year old boy, a mob of residents searching for criminals had begun 
torching shacks and a caravan and soon encountered Farai talking on his phone. He 
told them he was South African but they snatched his phone away from him, looked 
at the numbers on the phone and realised that he was actually from Zimbabwe. So 
they started beating him for telling a lie. The mob tried to force him to throw himself 
in a fire. He couldn’t do that so he tried to run away but they caught him and started 
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beating him like a dog. A 15 year old boy and a 17 year old girl are the only suspects 
facing trial for Farai’s murder. The three main assailants seen in the video were 
never arrested (Mtika, 2011: 1). 
On 27 January 2011, it was reported on the Timeslive news website that Gauteng 
community safety MEC Nonhlanhla Mazibuko was expected to visit Diepsloot, north 
of Johannesburg, following the murders of three people in mob justice attacks. A 
public meeting would be held to urge local residents not to take the law into their own 
hands, her office said in a statement. Meanwhile police said there had been no 
further reports of mob justice in the area, after the three were killed following 
allegations they were criminals. Lieutenant Colonel Lungelo Dlamini said the 
township was calm. How true could this be? (Sapa, 2011: 1) 
A suspect was nabbed from police custody in Diepsloot on 9 June 2011. Members of 
the community overpowered the police who had arrested the man, took him away 
and set him alight. Paramedics could not get to the man even though five police 
vehicles escorted them. The police eventually went in and fetched the patient, who 
was taken to Tembisa Hospital. The man, in his 30s, had firs-degree burns all over 
his body (iol.co.za, 2011:1). 
Bearak in the New York Times dated 22 July 2011 relates that Many people in 
Diepsloot believe mob justice is the right thing to do, and even if they kill someone 
innocent, they consider it collateral damage in a worthy cause. I know a tavern 
owner in Diepsloot named Walter. He was robbed and beaten one night, and the 
thieves got away with not only all his money but some of his clothes, including a 
favorite T-shirt. The next day a mob killed a man who was found wearing that shirt. 
Later in the week, I asked Walter if the right guy was dead. “I’m not sure about the 
man,” he told me, “but it was the right shirt.” He said he felt OK about it. 
Timeslive news platform published a news clip from Sapa on 06 February 2012 
wherein two men died and two were critically injured when they were attacked by 
Diepsloot community members in the early hours of that morning. This was reported 
by the Johannesburg emergency management services. The men were accused of 
stealing in the Diepsloot area and the community went looking for them and started 
beating them, spokesman Robert Mulaudzi recounted. All four men suffered multiple 
 28 
injuries, including head and spinal injuries. Two died on the scene and the other two 
were taken to the Tembisa Hospital. Mulaudzi said the incident was handed over to 
the police to investigate. He appealed to the community to not take justice into their 
own hands and let the law runs its course. 
The neighbour of a man killed in a mob justice attack in Diepsloot on Monday said he 
would have been beaten if he had tried to intervene. The man who witnessed the 
attack on 32-year-old Nkululeko Mathwasa maintained that he was wrongfully 
attacked and murdered by a mob in the northern Johannesburg township. Police 
arrested two suspects and have appealed to the public to come forward with any 
information. The two injured residents are in a critical condition in hospital (Timeslive, 
2012: 1). 
In one incident in June 2012, a man from Malawi is seen naked and bleeding, sitting 
in the centre of a pack of men, as the camera is recording everything. The men 
around him are clearly holding sticks, some have stones and others have bricks in 
their hands. The man is pelted with rocks which bounce off his head and his bare 
back. He is kicked and whipped and when he tries to run away, he was tripped and 
yet more stones are thrown at him. They leave him to recover and then he was 
hauled in front of the mob again only to be beaten further. At one stage you can see 
two women whipping him, deliberately aiming for his genitalia as the crowd yells 
encouragement to them (Crawford, 2012: 1). 
He had been found with a gun on him and in Diepsloot that is interpreted in only one 
way: you are a criminal and up to no good. The man pleads and begs for his life. You 
see him repeatedly shake his head as the vigilantes shout questions at him. No, no. 
Witnesses recounted that he had lost consciousness by the time the police and 
medics arrived and he died in hospital. Several residents were if they agree with this 
form of justice. They all did, to every man and woman who was asked. Bessie Tsimo 
is 47 with six children. If someone broke into your house or attacked you, who would 
you call? She responded that the community would come. She was asked further 
that and you would want that? Yes, I support it she responded (Crawford, 2012: 1). 
Ugen Vos (2012), a Beeld journalist reported in August about a motorist who was 
stoned to death in Diepsloot on 03 August 2012. A 51-year-old driver was stoned 
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and brutally kicked after he was dragged from his little truck after he had run down a 
woman and child in Sapphire Street in the Diepsloot. The woman Zukiswa Alarm 
(42) sustained serious head and back injuries and her four-year-old granddaughter 
Nelisiwe sustained injuries to her hand. The Daily Sun published pictures of the 
horrific attack on the driver. Bystanders described that two men had kicked the driver 
around like a soccer ball and that they jumped on him as if he were a “jumping-
castle”. The police managed to intervene in time before the driver was torched alive, 
and one of his assailants was arrested. 
Anton Harber described his experience patrolling with volunterr crime-fighters in 
Diepsloot. It was an extraordinary experience to find 50 unarmed volunteers of all 
ages working through the night, at great risk, to fight crime in a situation where the 
police are near-absent. I viewed it as a case of people finding their own practical 
solutions when the state fails them. Most of all I learnt to throw out crude notions of 
right and wrong, of justice and injustice, and understand the continuum that exists in 
reality between the two. You can only condemn and stop vigilantism if you offer 
decent policing, and Diepsloot does not have that yet (Pillay, 2011: 1). 
In June 2012, all the residents interviewed, complained of the high crime rate 
coupled with the apparent inability of the police to deal with cases. Many preferred to 
turn to the community thugs to sort out their problems rather than rely on the police 
(Crawford, 2012: 1). The table below was extracted from the SAPS crime statistics 
and reflects the extent of crime in Diepsloot over the period 2011 and 2012. 
Crime in Diepsloot (GP) for April to March 2003/2004 - 2011/2012 
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OTHER CRIME CATEGORIES 
Culpable 
homicide 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 
Public 
violence 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Crimen 
injuria 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 
 
The high crime rate experienced by the community is not illusion and the police must 
appear to be doing more to earn the community trust. But even if the police would 
say they are winning the war against crime yet the statistics would not be any 
consolation to the victims. The table above reflects that the highlighted crimes had a 
direct impact on the community and could have triggered the mob justice. It is 
unclear how many of the highlighted crimes were a result of mob justice. The reason 
why it is unclear is because the police registers assault (GBH), attempted murder 
and murder with no details. Nonetheless, the reality is that for the community of 
Diepsloot crime is not declining but rising. In 2010/2011 the total of this (highlighted) 
crime category was 242 and tripled in 2011/2012 to 755 (Crime Research Statistics-
South African Police Service, 2012: 1). 
The reflections above unanimously illustrate the perspective of vigilante participants 
who would be psychologically skewed towards violence. This account omits possible 
family units of the vigilante victims and the general community members who never 
participated in vigilante actions. 
2.8 RESPONSE FROM AUTHORITIES 
The security cluster has always developed and tried different methods of involving 
communities in combating crime with the aim to erode the distrust of the state’s 
ability to protect its citizens. Among other methods is the crime reporting hotlines 
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with guarantees of anonymity, community policing forums, Business Against Crime 
and Shout initiative (recently launched by entertainment industry) through a short 
messaging system (SMS). However, these methods are not yielding expected 
results. 
Minaar (2001: 24) made reference to the perceptions and motivation for vigilante 
activities in Diepsloot, whereby findings suggests that 65% of the respondents 
believed that vigilantism reduces crime (the study was conducted by the Institute for 
Human Rights and Criminal Justice in 2000). In contrast, 71% of respondents on 
another question admitted that vigilante activities were wrong and perpetuating 
crime. This finding sets a feasible ground for what authorities could use as a 
breakthrough for intervention against vigilantism. 
In the case of PAGAD the state was viewed to have taken a passive indirect 
approach to neutralise the formation. The State attitudes towards PAGAD changed 
as the organisation evolved from popular movement into urban terror organisation 
thus its underlying strategic orientation shifted towards the twin problems of 
gangsterism and vigilantism (Dixon and Johns, 2001: 41). 
One respondent argued that the events surrounding the death of gang leader 
Rashaad Staggie showed that the police were disabled and therefore perceived to 
be complicit with what was happening, for three main reasons. Firstly, as a result of 
their retraining and customisation to the new environment, they knew what not to do 
so as not to repeat the mistakes of the past, but they didn't know what to do in the 
new democratic order. Consequently, as the march erupted around them they 
hesitated (Dixon and Johns, 2001: 41). 
The second failure was one of planning and the learned inability of paramilitary 
policing units to operate without a clear set of instructions and according to well-
rehearsed plans of action. The third problem was a simple lack of resources. With 
the public order units already at full stretch to contain an outbreak of violence in the 
taxi industry, too few people were deployed to effectively police PAGAD marches 





3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Research approach is described as the framework, the scheme, and the strategies 
according to which the investigation can be done (Fouché, 2005: 268). This research 
was conducted using the qualitative approach due to the reason that the potential 
participants for this study provided historical information and that the selected 
approach allowed the researcher to exercise control over the line of questioning.  
According to Neuman (2006: 459) qualitative approach allows the researcher to 
develop explanations or generalisations that are close to concrete data and contexts.  
The researcher usually uses a lower level, less abstract theory, which is grounded in 
concrete details. This allowed the researcher to connect how people perceive and 
think about the social world with what they find in it hence the approach is alternative 
from abstracts and numbers with more inductive reflection of social reality (Neuman, 
2011: 199). 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN  
Fouché, et al., (2005:132) quoted Huysamen describing a research design as “the 
plan according to which data is collected to investigate the research hypothesis or 
question in the most economic manner”. This research gathered primary data 
through the use of semi-structured interviews. Greef (2005: 287) describes 
qualitative interviews as “attempts to understand the world from the participants’ 
point of view, to unfold the meaning of the people’s experience, and or uncover their 
lived world prior to scientific explanation”. Fifteen interviews were conducted with 
different people. The group comprised of the three policemen, one person from the 
Community Policing Forum, chairperson of the Community Youth Desk, secretary of 
the Community Patrollers, School principal, Ward Council Committee member, a 
survivor of mob attack and his family, a priest from Churches against Crime within 
Diepsloot, two persons from a street committee, two persons from the National 
Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC). The researcher scheduled a 
combination of face-to-face interviews, telephonic and e-mail interviews which 
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depended on the availability of the interviewees. Open ended questions were 
structured so as to allow the respondents to provide own opinion based on 
experience or scientific research. Field notes were used to collect primary data 
during the interviews. 
Secondary data was collected from scholarly journals and books, periodicals, 
dissertations, police reports and media reports. Existing regulatory framework guided 
the review of how effective are existing measures and how best can they be 
improved to curb and neutralise the vigilante activities. These sources were readily 
availability at libraries and in the internet and were not posing serious challenge with 
regard to the obtaining thereof. 
The research design embarked on an exploratory study. Exploratory studies lead to 
insight and comprehension and therefore it caters for an open and flexible research 
strategy and the use of methods such as literature reviews, interviews, case studies 
and informants (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 80). The reasons to undertake the 
exploratory study was to allow expanded in-depth knowledge of the research 
questions. Furthermore, this study attempted to test the feasibility of undertaking a 
more extensive study and to develop a new hypothesis about an existing security 
dilemma of vigilantism.   
3.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
Content analysis is applied for the purpose of analysing data. Content analysis is 
best suited for this because the technique examines the content, or information and 
symbols, contained in written documents or other communication medium.  Content 
analysis is most often used for descriptive purposes, but can be exploratory or 
explanatory as well (Neuman, 2006: 44). The researcher analysed data by focusing 
on the following; firstly, the development of themes and sub-themes from the primary 
data along the study objectives. Secondly, the data analysis is along the themes and 
sub-themes. Lastly, the presentation of findings is in the form of a research report. 
Conclusions and recommendations are drawn from the findings, with cognition 
placed on the research ethics. 
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3.4 MEASURES OF VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
Validity is made possible when the research instrument measures what is supposed 
to be measured. Validity is ensured in this research because the researcher was 
careful in choosing the method of data collection, i.e. interviews. The chosen data 
collection methods (interviews and secondary data) was also helpful in ensuring that 
results of this research are consistent should the research be conducted by another 
researcher. Reliability on the other hand, is achieved when the research instrument 
consistently produces the same results each time it is used (Babbie, et al., 2001: 
122). Getting information from people who had conducted research on the topic 
helped to enhance the measure of reliability. Objective presentation of data was 
ensured to eliminate any form of biasness from the side of the researcher. 
3.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The researcher believes that while there have been studies on the vigilante 
tendencies in South Africa, the focus has always been on relating incidents and 
proposing obvious solutions that cannot contribute to changing minds in the 
communities. Furthermore, the focus has mostly been generalising to different 
localities in either addressing vigilante groupings or certain areas where the fresh 
incidents are occurring. In this research, the focus was on Diepsloot with an intention 
to extend beyond the recount of events to include interrogation of motives and 
attitudes from the perspectives of the community elements. 
3.6 LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The ethics of science concerns what is wrong and what is right in the conduct of 
research (Mouton, 2001: 238). Neuman (2011: 502) presents a typical dilemma that 
confronts researchers: “Our selection criteria for using evidence and external 
criticism of documents puts the burden on the integrity of the individual researcher.” 
This challenge may be construed to be the selective focus of a researcher in order to 
manipulate the findings. To abide by the rules and regulations of research, the 
researcher ensured that consent was obtained from the interviewees who were 
participating in this research. During the process of obtaining such consent, the 
researcher revealed the purpose and objective of the research and also assured the 
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participants that they were not partaking in a dangerous exercise. The participants 
were encouraged to contribute to the research, an endeavour that is aimed at 
advancing the debate on the effects of vigilantism in the Diepsloot community. The 
participants were informed that their contributions will be acknowledged and 
published for academic purposes. The researcher also highlighted that should any 
participant decide to withdraw from the research, such decision will be respected by 
the researcher. 
Researching a paper on vigilantism was not an easy exercise. The persistent 
vigilante activities continue to paint a negative image of the government’s 
competency to execute its mandate. As a result, the respondents from security 
authorities were likely to reserve information in avoiding the indictment that comes 
with admission. Members in the community were expected to be suspicious and 
cooperation would be difficult hence the known induced pledge of secrecy on 
vigilante activities. The researcher engaged all respondents both telephonically and 
face-to-face to reinforce the confidence and integrity of the research thus eliminating 
the fear of incrimination. As a result no secret or clandestine research was 
conducted. Availability of respondents posed a challenge in conducting this 
research; however, reasonable efforts to meet the expected results were done 
without compromising the set academic standards. On the other front, this study 
presented a challenge in that the vigilante activities are commonly short circuit and 
many of the ideas and possible theories tend to have been captured by other 
authors. However, the limitation is overcome by the focal lens from which this 
research is based. 
3.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The research report covers the following chapters: 
3.7.1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the research topic through a broad outline of the geographic 
and social landscape of the Diepsloot community. The geographic landscape 
introduces the coming into being of the location while the social landscape explores 
the socio-economic make-up of the community, thereby covering the emergence of 
vigilantism. The vigilantism problem in Diepsloot is not unique in the context of the 
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general sporadic incidents of violent mob justice in South Africa. As a result, the 
chapter further covers the background of vigilantism through a synopsis of other 
such incidents in South Africa. 
3.7.2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review provides the conceptual framework in the research project. The 
manifestation of vigilante attacks and the extent of societal effects on the community 
are examined. The response from the state security apparatus is reviewed along 
with its commitment to resolving this horrendous tendency. Reflection is also given to 
the trends of vigilantism that developed pre and post-democratic dispensation. 
3.7.3 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the focus is placed on methods and techniques to be employed in 
this research project. These methods incorporate the data analysis. This research 
project will be conducted on a qualitative approach in order to cater for the historical 
information that may be provided by the respondents and create leverage for the 
exercise of control over the line of questioning. As a result, this chapter outlines in 
detail how the qualitative method will guide the research project. This chapter further 
speaks to the research design whereby the sourcing of information comprises of 
primary and secondary data collection in order to enhance the reality analysis. 
3.7.4 CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS 
This is where data collection culminates in the consolidation and analysis of the 
collected data. The discussions in this chapter integrate the primary and secondary 
data thus rounding off the arguments against the research questions and spelling out 
the findings. 
3.7.5 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter will marry up the arguments and consolidate the research effort into the 
final position of the researcher. This will also address the recommendations for best 




The current trends of vigilantism show that no one should shy away from the 
possible resolve of this undesirable activity. Logic suggests that crime is out of 
control in South Africa, especially in the informal settlements where the harsh reality 
of poverty resides. The situation in Diepsloot, with the unemployment rate so high, 
would remain a problem for the community and the security agencies. The one 
important deduction is that, since vigilantism is a crime, it should be approached as 
such and not be diluted by charging perpetrators on the end-state alone. This 
literature has established that while the collective approach on these horrendous 
activities is termed vigilantism, yet perpetrators are charged of assault, murder and 
arson or damage to property. In true sense, it will be difficult to corner a single 
individual, involved in mob violence, to have committed murder if the autopsy alleges 
the cause of death was assault. 
The incapacity of state apparatus to cover the area of Diepsloot continues to prompt 
the increase in vigilante activities. Issues like inaccessibility into the shanty 
residences cannot be accepted as an excuse due to the constitutional mandate that 
allows Diepsloot to demand security services the same way other settlements 
(suburbs) receive. The court systems cannot constantly justify their administrative 
problem (backlog) without a solution that would restore confidence back to the 
community. 
This research brought to the fore, the scale of vigilantism in the area of Diepsloot 
and how serious this issue should be taken. It is in the view of this paper that, since 
the security realm is complex, the measures that are employed to maintain a state of 
security are equally complex. The researcher believes that after so many techniques 
and tactics have been explored and documented, (arresting of Mapogo-a-
Mathamaga branch leader in Diepsloot, group arrest of people after a mob justice 
incident, community policing forums, etc), they have not yielded intended results. 
The need to explore other means of evaluating the effects of vigilantism on the 
community and draw up intervention measures based on the buy-in of the 






Greef (2005: 287) describes qualitative interviews as “attempts to understand the 
world from the participants’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of the people’s 
experience, and or uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanation”. The 
researcher gathered primary data through the use of semi-structured interviews. 
Fifteen interviews were conducted with experts (South African Police Service (in 
Diepsloot), National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and State Security 
Agency, Diepsloot Ward Councillor and the community structures (church, school, 
community policing forum) and the general public on the topic to be researched. The 
researcher scheduled a combination of face-to-face interviews, telephonic and e-mail 
interviews guided by the availability of the interviewees. Open ended questions were 
structured allowing the respondents to provide own opinions based on experience or 
scientific research. Field notes were used to collect primary data during the 
interviews. 
Secondary data was collected from scholarly journals and books, periodicals, 
dissertations, police reports and presented papers. Existing regulatory framework 
guided the review of how effective existing measures are and how best can they be 
improved in order to curb and neutralise vigilante activities. These sources were 
readily available at libraries and on the internet and did not pose a serious challenge 
with regard to the obtaining thereof. 
The research design embarked on an exploratory study. Exploratory studies lead to 
insight and comprehension, and therefore it catered for an open and flexible 
research strategy and the use of methods such as literature reviews, interviews, 
case studies and informants (Babbie and Mouton, 2001: 80). The reason for 
undertaking the exploratory study was to allow expanded in-depth knowledge of the 
research questions. Furthermore, this study allowed the researcher to test the 
feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study and to develop a new hypothesis 
about the existing security dilemma of vigilantism. 
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4.2 DATA COLLECTION 
Interviews were the main instrument the researcher used to collect information. 
Given the qualitative approach as described in chapter three, the endeavour to cover 
the broad scope of the community of Diepsloot qualifies as a systematic investigation 
through which the relevance of the research will be justifiable. The knowledge that 
the effect of vigilantism can be better accounted for by the focus group, constructive 
engagement with the community elicited optimism and balanced the response to the 
interview questions. 
The researcher covered the persons from different components of the Diepsloot 
community and security that included:  
 Institutions of security (police members at Diepsloot Police Station, National 
Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and State Security), 
 Different structures of the community (school, community policing forum and 
the Councillor), 
 Residents of Diepsloot 
4.2.1 Interviews 
Interviews allowed the research to travel the path that the affected community has 
traversed thus a first-hand encounter of explicit accounts enhanced the researcher’s 
picture of events. An interview is a process of oral and constructive engagement 
between two or more parties with a purpose of bilateral sourcing of information. 
Interviews were conducted with the police members from the Diepsloot Police 
Station who collectively conceded, although defensively that vigilantism has shifted 
away from permanent groupings, like Mapogo-a-Mathamaga, but the mob attacks 
remain prevalent. As a result, the researcher paid attention to the mob justice with a 
clear distinction between violent protests and mob violence. The reason for this 
distinction is that some participants expressed views around protests that turned 
violent. 
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Community structures that were interviewed covered similar ground to that of the 
police as a result of direct link to the police station. Nonetheless, they also gave 
account from residents’ perspective whereby they acknowledged that the scourge of 
crime remains the driving force behind vigilante attacks. 
The researcher also engaged with the residents in an attempt to source opinions 
from perpetrator and victim perspectives wherein the note of dissatisfaction on police 
service delivery was highlighted. On the one hand, the perpetrator asserted that 
crime is rampant and their intervention is yielding results. On the other hand, the 
victim maintained that they had not done any crime but just because someone has 
screamed or blew a whistle then one will encounter this onslaught. 
4.2.2 Focus Group 
The researcher used a focus group that was representative of the community of 
Diepsloot. As highlighted at 3.2 and in paragraph 4.2.1, the group comprised of the 
three policemen, one person from the Community Policing Forum, chairperson of the 
Community Youth Desk, secretary of the Community Patrollers, school principal, 
Ward Council Committee member, a survivor of a mob attack and his family, a priest 
from Churches Against Crime within Diepsloot, two persons from a street committee, 
two persons from the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC). 
The interviews were mostly conducted through face-to-face and three telephonic 
interviews. The objective of the research was constantly explained and the 
respondents comprehended well thus responded within context but mostly 
highlighting that there has been a calm period since January 2012. 
4.2.3 Fieldwork Experience 
The interviews were conducted mostly in Diepsloot while those of NICOC were 
conducted at the offices of the respondents. All respondents were given the consent 
form that specified the purpose and objectives of the research which they signed or 
acknowledged. The researcher travelled to Diepsloot and started at the police station 
where a police officer co-ordinating social crime in the community was a point of 
reference. The police officer welcomed the interview and was resourceful. In his 
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account of vigilante activities, he asserted that the incidents are declining hence the 
state of calamity. He had no reservation around whether his identity may be 
disclosed in the research report or not since he had also worked with Professor 
Anton Harber on his book “Diepsloot”. In terms of the general community, there was 
general discontent around the purpose of the research and mistrust on possible 
compromise should the observers suspect anything. But the researcher blended into 
the community thus earning their confidence. 
Overall the researcher managed to win the trust of the respondents including the 
mob justice survivor and the objective of the interviews was attained. The 
researcher’s scope of respondents aimed to balance the perspectives in order to 
answer the research questions. 
As a result of trust, the researcher was invited to a meeting on 13 March 2013 where 
various initiatives were being sanctioned. The meeting comprised various 
stakeholders including the; Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(Legal Aid SA), Gauteng Provincial Government, City of Johannesburg, Nowethu 
Business Chamber (Men’s Forum) and SAPS (Diepsloot). This body extended a 
request to the University of the Witwatersrand to be on board with these initiatives 
and assist especially on situational studies, impact analysis and development of 
concept documents when the need arises. 
4.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
Content analysis was employed because it is best suited for this research since the 
technique examines the content, or information and symbols, contained in written 
documents or other communication media. Furthermore, this approach of analysis is 
most often used for descriptive purposes, but can be exploratory or explanatory as 
well (Neuman, 2006: 44). The researcher analysed data by focusing on the 
development of themes from the primary data along the study objectives and the 
data analysis is along the themes. 
The themes that emerged during data collection allowed the researcher to 
comprehend how respondents felt about vigilantism especially in the three areas of 
the authority, perpetrator and victim. The authority views the vigilante incidents as 
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sporadic and reflecting lawlessness. The perpetrator maintained that if crime 
confronts their daily lives, they will do something about it. The victim was in despair 
and hopelessness because coming forward to help authorities with apprehension 
and prosecution of perpetrators presents additional danger. The researcher 
observed the following themes during the interviews with the focus group, before 
even engaging in the data analysis. 
The themes that emanated from interviews include: 
 The community prefers instant justice thus mob justice is the norm, 
 Targets have no description, 
 Security cluster is fragmented around integrated participation. 
The respondents were selected in such a manner to proportionally cover the 
community and the authorities. Out of those interviewed: 
  Five were from the State security apparatuses (police and intelligence)-
respondents A, E, I, K and P. 
  Four were from the community structures (Ward Councillor-M, church-N, 
school-H and CPF-C&D). 
  Six were from the general community membership mostly focused at 
balancing the views of both the victim and the perpetrator (B, J, D, F, O, and 
G). 
The respondents were generally content around the subject with the exception of the 
community members due to the fear of reprisals by fellow residents. Officials from 
the State apparatuses were relatively cautious about their disclosure giving the 
reason that the interviews were not sanctioned by the departments. As a result, 
emphasis had been placed on their anonymity during report writing. Therefore the 
researcher uses the pseudonym “respondent” in an attempt to protect and uphold 
the researcher’s commitment to respondents. 
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4.4 Themes and Analysis 
Interviews revealed that vigilantism or mob justice was prevalent although the 
situation is currently calm. The underlying cause of mob justice has been associated 
with the scourge of crime. The establishment of the Diepsloot Police Station in 2010 
brought about a reduction in crime, but there still are problems of burglary, rape, 
pick-pocketing and mugging. In light of the questions, most respondents expressed 
their views as stakeholders in anti-crime efforts. 
4.4.1 The community prefers instant justice thus vigilantism is the norm 
Respondent J was interviewed on 28 February 2013. He is not a Diepsloot resident 
but frequents the area and has knowledge of it. He explained that acts of vigilantism 
are barbaric in their nature and indeed popular in the informal settlements. The 
criteria around which the mob justice is meted out are strongly based on rumours, 
the history or profile of the victim and false accusations. 
He recounted an incident at his aunt’s place in Wespark (Pretoria). She had 
experienced burglary, whereby upon the whistle blowing the community reacted 
instantly and hunted the criminals. Coincidentally, they ran into a pair of youngsters 
who were jogging towards the mob’s direction and were pounced upon as the guilty 
parties. 
The respondent’s view on the causes of mob justice is scarce resources, 
unemployment, political contestations and existing frustrations around service 
delivery thus crime becomes a trigger to vent frustrations. 
Respondent A, from Diepsloot, interviewed on 03 March 2013, addressed the reason 
why the community resorts to mob justice. According to him, the community is 
unhappy with the criminal justice process because they would often assist in the 
arrest of a criminal who is then released either on bail or through acquittal. To the 
community, the criminal is guilty until proven innocent thus whenever they would 
volunteer a suspect to the police they expect only guilt convictions. 
The respondent was also asked about the psychological make-up of the perpetrators 
of mob justice. He highlighted the fact that during mob attacks, the front-runners are 
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hailed as community heroes therefore impulsiveness becomes the order of the day. 
However when the vigilante perpetrators are arrested, the community tends to back 
off leaving the perpetrators-turned-criminals to fend for themselves. To the 
respondent the situation of the community is complicated to analyse the perception 
because the age and gender distribution of perpetrators are cross-cutting. In his 
previous personal encounters, he arrested a 16 year old girl who has since been 
sentenced to 18 years in prison, a 52 year old man now serving 25 years and a 47 
year old man serving an 18 years jail terms. 
On 3 March 2013, the residents of Extension 8 in Diepsloot held a community 
meeting at the corner of Phumla and Ngonyama Streets. About 28 to 30 residents 
attended. Among the convenors were members of the community policing forum and 
the patrol volunteers. The purpose of the meeting was to revive the CPF structures 
and allocate them to the police sector manager. The meeting was delayed due to the 
absence of actual residents, “stand owners”, (also referred to as boMa-stand). This 
implied most of the attendants were tenants who had little say on issues in the 
community. Whilst the meeting was addressing the issue of the police-community 
relationship, the stand owners still held the position of self-help on issues of crime. 
This position was confirmed by some speakers who constantly highlighted that there 
would be no more tolerance for popular justice. 
Respondent B, a Youth Desk official, was interviewed on 03 March 2013. She spoke 
on the issue of vigilantism indicating that there were no groupings that would qualify 
as vigilante groups in Diepsloot. However, there are still people referred to as 
comrades who are aligned with South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) 
and those referred to as Block Committees who tend to take the law into their own 
hands. They position themselves as community representatives thus problems would 
be brought to them. As a result, some cases will be around hatred for which the 
committee would be prejudiced in tendering justice. 
Respondent B shared the same description, as respondent A, of perpetrators as 
persons who lack conscience and moral foundation. Furthermore, during the mob 
attack, these perpetrators are driven by the egoistic tendency to show off. The 
perpetrators of mob justice tend to worsen the crime situation in that survivors return 
to the community vengefully resulting in gangs and further crime being committed. 
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In her observation of mob attacks, the respondent indicated that the mothers in the 
community would never participate in attacks but the trauma to families is 
immeasurable. The identification of targets by vigilantes does not make provision for 
mistaken identity and even after such a discovery there would be no sense of 
remorse towards the affected family.  
The respondent recounted two incidents that occurred in the last week of February 
2013. In both incidents suspects were accused of rape and theft and they were 
attacked and badly assaulted, but the police managed to intervene on time. This 
observation (police reaction time) by the respondent, speaks to the improvements on 
course that should see the community mobilised out of mob justice tendencies. 
Respondent D was interviewed on 09 March 2013. He is from Extension 2 and 
presented the fact that mob justice has dramatically declined in 2012 but there are 
still sporadic incidents. His account explained the link between vigilantism and mob 
justice whereby he highlighted that some members of SANCO tend to resist the role 
of the CPF and they play the role of community representatives which leads to the 
perpetuation of self-help. His view was inclined towards the community’s lack of 
awareness and mistrust of the criminal justice processes thus their (vigilantes) 
approach tends to be justified in their eyes. 
Respondent L was interviewed on 09 March 2013 in Extension 12. She indicated 
that crime continues to bother them and the community wants to see the criminal 
justice system working. When asked whether she had participated in mob justice, 
she indicated that she never leaves her house because she would be scared to fall 
prey to mistaken identity for a criminal. On the community perception about mob 
justice, she believed that the community was divided around that since there are 
some who still promote self-help against crime. There is a block committee that exist 
to solve residents’ problems including crime and family matters. 
Respondent L further indicated that whilst the situation is currently calm in her 
extension, there had been three incidents of mob justice in 2012. In her observation 
the police would take far too long to arrive at crime scenes. This would be caused by 
the lack of infrastructure (roads and illumination). Since these incidents mostly 
happen at night, it becomes difficult for the police to access the areas especially 
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extensions 1 and 12. Equally, she believes that criminals know the area allowing 
them navigate their way through the shacks and escape from police. 
The respondent was asked for her perception on mob justice. She expressed her 
objection to mob justice describing it as wrong yet she approved of its aim, in other 
words curbing crime given a lack of police visibility. 
Respondent M, serving on the ward council, was interviewed on 09 March 2013 and 
concurred with respondent L that the community still is inclined to mob justice due to 
lack of education around the criminal justice system. In the eyes of the community, 
the only picture they see is the upsetting view of rampant crime and criminals who 
are let off the hook. The other issue is that the police take time to respond to crime, 
fuelling impatience among the community and leading to lawlessness. 
The respondent further alluded to the issues of unemployment, poverty and alcohol 
abuse. These issues influence youngsters to be adversely influenced to pursue 
crime as a way of meeting their socio-economic needs. Respondent M pointed 
Extension 12 as a problematic area. This area like Extension 1 has infrastructure 
problems which include congestion, lack of electrical lighting, thus making facilitating 
criminal operations at night difficult. Since the police capacity to react is limited, the 
community also prefers mob justice in the night when potential to be identified is 
minimised. 
Respondent O is a resident of Extension 12 and serves on the street committee. He 
was interviewed on 10 March 2013. Overall there were other participants (4) who are 
his friends, some of whom serve on the committee. The problem of crime was 
highlighted and the issue of police reaction time was presented as an issue of 
concern. However, the respondent insisted that poor road infrastructure cannot be 
an excuse for the police because there are different access routes to Extension 12. 
Therefore, whenever the police are called, they would have options to respond in a 
timely fashion. Apart from slow a reaction time; there is no visible policing in 
Diepsloot which paves the way for crime to continue unabated. 
There is also a problem of partial justice whenever a criminal is associated with the 
authorities. As an example, whenever a case of rape is reported against a relative or 
acquaintance of police, the police would do shabby work thus deliberately 
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compromising the case. What pains the community is when they are expected to 
accept the criminal back into their community therefore contributing to the loss of 
trust in the criminal justice system. 
The street or block committee has been created to help the community deal with 
issues that can be resolved within the boundaries of the law without the involvement 
of authorities. Family disputes are presented to them and they preside over the 
mediation and reconciliation of conflicting parties. Moreover, when there is a third 
party (i.e. neighbour) implicated, such a person would also be summoned before the 
committee. For example, when a couple is fighting because of what a neighbour 
contributed (gossip), such neighbour would be disciplined. The community also 
addresses their children’s problems through the committee. The respondent talked 
about his own son who he brought before the committee when the son was involved 
in drugs. He was confident that it was due to the lashes the son received from the 
committee that he shaped up afterwards. 
One participant pointed out that mob justice is a reality in Diepsloot, especially in 
Extensions 1 and 12, to the extent that it is a daily occurrence. His point was then 
supported by others in that the rate of crime should be linked to the rate of mob 
justice. However none of them admitted to have participated in any of the attacks 
except respondent O was confident regarding his intervention in apprehending some 
suspects on various occasions. The collective submission of the participants was 
that they are cooperating with the CPF structures. They have created an 
arrangement that when a case is too serious for them to handle, they escalate it to 
CPF members who then will liaise with the police. 
4.4.2 Targets have no description 
Respondent G, a 20 year old victim of mob justice on the morning of 12 November 
2011, sadly recounted how the events unfolded on that day. He indicated that he 
was walking from a shebeen in Extension 2, where his grandmother resides, with 
two of his friends around 06h00 when a taxi deposited two ladies about 100 meters 
in front of them. As the ladies were about to pass them, the ladies screamed and 
people came out, within seconds, and lunged on them. The two friends managed to 
run away and he was captured. He recounted the objects used during the assault 
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that included steel rods, electric cables, stones and bricks. His last memory of these 
events was one of the attackers hitting him with a brick on the head causing him to 
fall unconscious. 
The researcher investigated the cause of alarm, particularly what made the ladies 
scream. The respondent indicated that when he left home Friday night of 11 
November, he stole his father’s pistol and left with his friends. At some point he gave 
the pistol to his friend to keep it for him. As they were walking home, to 
grandmother’s place, the friend took out the gun to admire it. At this point the two 
ladies saw the gun which was the cause for the alarm even though the friend had not 
pointed it at them. But the attack was worsened by the fact that the friend had given 
back the gun to him and the mob found the gun in him. 
The respondent was asked about the trends of vigilante attacks in the community. 
He presented it as rampant and happening almost weekly even though most do not 
end in deaths. On the question of who the targets are, he asserted that the mob has 
no criteria on their targets. There is a popular alarm signal called “vimba” whereby 
anyone can scream “vimba” and the community will be mobilised. The problem with 
this alarm system is that when two people have differences, one can signal a mob to 
attack the offending party by simply shouting “vimba”. 
The researcher enquired about the police’s effectiveness in the area and the 
respondent indicated that they are not proactive around these incidents. Even when 
the alert signal would be sent in time, there has been a tendency of police arriving at 
a scene and delaying intervention. One such incident occurred in Extension 8 early 
in 2012, when the police and ambulance arrived and did not rescue the victim; 
instead they appeared helpless. The intervention only commenced when another 
police officer arrived at the scene and managed to rescue the victim. But very 
seldom perpetrators would be arrested and brought to book. His incident, where he 
was assaulted, is one of those where he will never know justice as it is with the 
families of other victims. On the issue of his adaptation in the community since he 
was assaulted incident, he indicated that he had to put the incident behind him and 
continue with his life. He maintained that he was not seeking revenge because he 
did not recognise the attackers but at the same time he said that he could not rule 
out an attack possibly recurring. 
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Respondent F, who is a sister of Respondent G, counted the impact of the mob 
justice on their livelihood. The respondent indicated that the incident of 2011 has 
changed their lives altogether because they never learned why their son was 
assaulted. The sister, who was the first family member to arrive at the scene, 
claimed some members of the mob said the victim had raped someone whilst others 
said he had stolen somewhere but none from the mob disclosed details. 
The respondents also affirmed the alarm system of “vimba”, maintaining that it was 
indiscriminate and not about crime only but that hatred of each other in the 
community played a role. The perpetrators never show remorse. The known 
hotspots in Diepsloot are Extensions 1, 2 and 5. The respondent maintained that the 
police never came in time and were not supportive of the victims. The sister of the 
victim recounted on the difficulties they endured to transport the victim to Tembisa 
Hospital and the delay that was encountered at the hospital before the victim could 
be attended to. They arrived at the hospital at about 07h00 and were only attended 
to at around 12h00, while the victim was unconscious. Throughout the pre-admission 
delay, the police were sitting around without assisting them (at least with 
pressurising the nurses to attend to the patient) even though the victim was also a 
detainee for the unlicenced gun that was found in his possession. 
Respondent F shared that they constantly live in fear because every time the victim 
leaves the house they are afraid he might fall a victim again. The victim has been 
traumatised by the incident and is now a short-tempered and overly suspicious 
person. 
On the vigilante formations, the respondent indicated that mob justice by far has no 
platform but the existence of street committees has an inclination towards 
vigilantism. She indicated that children of street committee members, who are 
implicated in criminal activities, are always protected. 
Respondent L maintained that crime is rife in Extension 12 and while she does not 
condone mob attacks, some community members promote it. According to her the 
ineffective crime policing exacerbates this community’s resolve. She then made note 
of a street committee which helps the community with crime and family problems. 
When asked about how the committee administers justice, she was shy to respond 
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but indicated that the community has confidence in the committee even though she 
has not used their services yet. 
Respondent K highlighted that the criterion for selecting targets by mobs is skewed. 
The target criteria will mostly be skewed towards a man, unemployed, a substance 
abuser and social cliques in the community. Therefore the target’s identity is so 
blurry that anyone may fall prey to mob justice. At the same time, the instantaneous 
charge at a victim is a cause for concern because even in an effective policing 
system the reaction time would unlikely to match the speed of a mob attack. 
4.4.3 Security cluster is fragmented around integrated participation. 
Respondent K, from the security cluster (NICOC) was interviewed on 28 February 
2013. He outlined the cause of vigilantism as the break-down of trust between 
communities and security apparatus which gives rise to self-help tactics. These 
tactics would involve killings and severe injuries to the victims. However the vigilante 
attacks tend to spiral into reprisal attacks resulting from survivors trying to settle 
scores or even arrested perpetrators avenging the compromise that resulted in their 
arrests. 
Crime is labelled as the primary cause of mob justice. The state security apparatus 
tends to be over-stretched. This results in the inability by the police to address mob 
attacks. At the same time the problem of unemployment and poverty fuels the 
prominence of petty crimes with the typical intention of stealing money to support 
habits such as drug use. 
The respondents K and P were asked about the attention placed on mob justice 
within the security sector. They indicated that given the trends of mob justice across 
the country, there were justified grounds for the escalation of this phenomenon to the 
level of national security threat. However, at this juncture, the incidents of mob 
justice are painted with a second coat rendering the situation less visible. The 
second coating, speaks to the conscious act by authorities to label and package mob 
justice on its outcomes alone therefore reducing the cumulative effect. It is this view 
that has resulted in principals in the security cluster not tabling this issue 
independently.  
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The respondents presented the argument that mob justice is not distinct from the 
2008 xenophobic attacks that received immediate attention at the national level. 
They, however, argued that another element that may be contributing to passive 
action from state apparatus is the problem of capacity; for example, if masses were 
mobilised to assist police with information on perpetrators, there would be a costly 
witness protection programme. 
The respondent highlighted the problem of silo functions in the security sector 
whereby problems like mob justice are alienated to crime policing. According to him, 
the issue of vigilantism requires collective focus, where crime policing is 
supplemented with intelligence operations aimed at sharpening early warning 
systems. Moreover, the coherence in intelligence with awareness campaigns will 
boost visible policing. This view was informed by the fact that apart from crime 
intelligence, structures of social stability should be channelled to cover this area. 
Respondent A from the Diepsloot Police Station was interviewed on 03 March 2013. 
The respondent indicated that mob justice incidents have subsided dramatically in 
2012/13 as a review cycle. In 2012, they dealt with five murders, three of which were 
related to mob justice. In 2013, the police have only handled one murder as a result 
of mob justice. The respondent was adamant that the recording of mob justice 
incidents would distort the crime picture and crime by mob justice is assault, 
attempted murder or murder. Therefore the statistics speaking specifically to mob 
justice do not exist but police dockets do reflect whether the cause of injury or death 
was mob attack. 
The respondent reflected on the challenges encountered by the police being that the 
community would sometimes be hostile towards the police thus affecting the 
efficiency of intervening in time. Secondly, there are still some elements of street 
committees that see themselves as the middle ground between law enforcement 
structures and the community. This tends to affect the role of the police because of 
community members that would be more comfortable in using these structures than 
going to the police. The third challenge is the inadequate resources like vehicles 
rendering it difficult to cover the area of Diepsloot especially when there would be 
more than one call for police officers to respond to simultaneously. In some 
instances, the problem of resources is exacerbated by the absence of hospital 
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facilities. In this case, when a victim or suspect has to be taken to hospital, the police 
station has to use the Tembisa Hospital where time consumption, while waiting for 
medical attention, can range from two hours or even a day. 
The decline in mob justice is apportioned to the multifaceted projects where the 
community is mobilised away from antagonism with the police. Current programmes 
include active community policing forums, a youth desk, men’s forum, patrollers and 
churches on anti-crime and anti-mob justice. These programmes are more aimed at 
anti-crime campaigns which centrally attempt to drive the mind-shift away from crime 
and at the same time to discourage mob justice. 
Respondent E from the same police station held the view that mob justice is on the 
decline; however, it is still an issue of concern. According to his knowledge, they 
would handle about four incidents in a month. He did apportion the perceived decline 
to the active role played by the CPF structures. He further recounted that, in the 
incidents he attended, the predominant perpetrators were youngsters lashing out 
their frustrations not about crime but other community issues like unemployment. 
Respondent I, the sector manager (Extensions 2, 4 and 8), is from Diepsloot Police 
Station and was interviewed on 08 March 2013. He indicated that mob justice is the 
norm in Diepsloot especially in Extensions 1, 2 and 9. In his observation, community 
members preferred not to report crime to the police. He maintained that the reason 
should not be limited to the break-down of trust in the police but also the 
cumbersome legal marathon that complainants sometimes are not prepared to 
handle. 
This respondent indicated that the community is never violent to the police even if 
they would often be hostile when the police do not approach the situation correctly. 
He related an incident in 2012, where he was called from vocational leave when his 
colleagues were helpless at the site of mob justice. The respondent walked into the 
situation and rescued the victim. 
The resident from Extension 4, respondent J, was interviewed on 08 March 2013. He 
pointed out that there were no groupings similar to the Mapogo-a-Mathamaga but 
there are Block Committees and “Maguerilla”, who plays the role of intervening when 
community needs their assistance on crime and family disputes. However, since the 
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CPF and the police are active, crime and mob justice is under control. The decline is 
further attributed to patrols that constantly bust out drugs dens, guns illegal 
shebeens and criminals. When asked about the last mob justice incident in the area, 
he indicated that one had been committed in the last three weeks (mid-February 
2013). 
Respondent H (school) and N (church) were interviewed on 04 and 09 March 2013 
respectively. Respondent H had a general disassociation to the notion that Diepsloot 
community is generally a violent society. He maintained that he had not heard of any 
mob justice since the time of the xenophobic attacks. He asserted that there would 
be sporadic incidents of boys fighting in his school and the seldom discovery of 
pocket knives that were confiscated. 
Respondent N acknowledged the problem of mob justice but insisted that the 
situation was exaggerated. He signalled that since January 2012 they have 
embarked on Operation Spiritual Intervention with inter-denominational programmes 
involving circling the community with prayer sessions. According to him there has 
been a major effect in shifting the community away from mob attacks to cooperating 
with the police. He, however, conceded that mob justice did leave permanent scars 












FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four dealt with the presentation of data collected and has put forward a 
contextualised analysis of data presented by interviewees. The themes, along which 
the data analysis has been presented, are again juxtaposed alongside the findings of 
this chapter. The findings are founded and contextualised from a qualitative 
approach. It is on these findings that recommendations would be based thus 
allowing the researcher to propose workable solutions. 
The chapter aims to report on the findings thus concentrating on the presentation 
and analysis of data derived from the interviews. It is noteworthy to draw the 
connection of vigilantism and mob justice as concepts in order to eliminate 
misrepresentation of the research topic. 
The premise of vigilantism, as presented in chapter two, remains coherent to this 
point in the report. The researcher presented the descriptive view that vigilantism is a 
practice by individuals or organised groups focused on self-protection against any 
threat against self, personal assets and the community. The definitions presented by 
different authors (Nina, Minaar, Skhonyane and Louw, and Buur and Jensen,) in this 
research have pointed towards vigilantism as an entity, formation or a grouping. 
However, the common denominator has always been self-service against crime. It is 
this denominator that is clarified in chapter two to then cover terms such as mob 
justice, popular justice, violent justice and vigilante activities in reference to 
vigilantism. 
5.2 FINDINGS 
5.2.1 Perception of the community about vigilante incidents 
The frequency of mob justice in Diepsloot has reached the point where the 
community has habituated around the incidents. Whenever such incidents occur, 
non-participants would be more curious to know if the victim is related to them more 
than in restraining each other. The respondents have shied away from believing that 
 55 
mob justice is a norm in this community whilst at the same time complaining about 
the ineffectiveness of the police in combating crime. This culminates into a moral 
dilemma of “it is wrong but they deserve it”. 
All respondents, not belonging to community structures, shared in the belief that mob 
justice is wrong but that it does send a strong deterrent message to criminals. This 
notion speaks directly to the norm factor around popular justice as presented by 
respondent A. The fact that when a suspect has been apprehended, there is violent 
euphoria in response to the punishment is an indicator of a generally violent 
community. Respondent A’s description of perpetrators can only mean that the 
community is either condoning mob justice or they are held hostage fearing that such 
punishment could be directed at them should they appear to be condemning it. 
The popular alarm system (whistle and “vimba”) as a trigger for mob onslaught is 
quite tricky and can be misleading. The respondents’ emphasis on the instantaneous 
response should be seen as an indicator of a readily charged community waiting for 
the alarm. The reality that the perpetrators of mob justice are seldom arrested, 
qualifies their reason for regarding themselves as community heroes, as described 
by respondents A and B. The age variation of vigilante perpetrators (16, 47 and 52) 
further qualifies the supposition that mob justice is the norm because this means that 
teenagers and adults think alike when it comes to mob attacks. 
It is fair to acknowledge that, prior to the establishment of the Diepsloot Police 
Station in 2010; it was difficult for the community to experience service delivery from 
Erasmia. This implies their version of authority and justice must have been distorted. 
If from 1995 to 2010, the only way to access the police services was to travel, then it 
makes sense that the community of Diepsloot had no police to break the trust with. 
Therefore the community is in a psychological transition to accessible police services 
and undergoing reconditioning away from self-help tendencies. 
The police station’s capacity to service the community seems viable from the 
account of officers interviewed as well as visual observation. The Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Police Department has personnel at the station acting as force 
multiplier. However on the ground the respondents do not feel attended to. In all 
accounts, except from police and CPF structures, respondents asserted that there is 
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extremely minimal police visibility in the community. This implies that the crime 
prevention strategy is reactive and often having to negotiate ground with the 
community’s crime prevention strategy, i.e. mob justice. With regard to negotiating 
ground, respondent I made mention of the attitude of police when attending mob 
justice incidents. Police officers have to present a positive attitude to calm the mob 
hence the delayed intervention as reflected on by respondents F and G. 
The intervention measures tend to be slow and will take time to yield results. Indeed 
community mobilisation is not a simple task; it is worth noting that the community 
have to buy into the strategy. The CPF seems not to appeal to the stand owners, as 
reflected through respondent C. 
Respondents D, F, G, L, M and O concurred that Block Committees tend to act like 
vigilante groups but their influence is currently being defused through the activation 
of CPF structures. However, respondent O’s account of his street committee implies 
that they are there to stay and can only reduce their crime oversight rather than 
disbanding the committee. 
5.2.2 Targets have no description 
The general account of mob justice is that crime is the catalyst and that it appeals to 
a remarkable portion of the community. Nonetheless, the problem arises when the 
criminal is not obvious. If one looks at the setup of Extensions 1 and 12, the clear 
identification of a criminal in the dark should be almost unviable. 
The “vimba” and whistle signals have been criticised by all respondents as 
dangerous because in the night anyone can scream or whistle. As respondents A, F 
and G indicated, targets are not always criminals but could be foes having scores to 
settle. The mob justice perpetrators generally cause harm to the community rather 
than solving the problems. 
It is somehow clear that the lack of remorse can be attributed to the community’s 
mind-set that they are fighting crime. As a result all victims should be attached to 
some blame. This means that even if the victim may turn out to be mistaken target, 
the community will find something to blame it on the victim (as alluded to by 
respondent F). 
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The police’s complacency when they delay intervention shows signs of weakness, 
thus mob justice perpetrators tend to feel invincible. Therefore, the likelihood of mob 
justice, continuing unabated, remains high, thus perpetuating the permanent scars in 
the community and setting the tone for the younger generation. 
5.2.3 Authorities’ response 
The respondents J and P from the intelligence community submitted that mob justice 
is cancerous in the society and if there is no directed effort aimed at curbing such 
incidents, there will be eventual lawlessness. However, there is no current indexing 
of mob justice incidents thus the cumulative effect of individual cases is not 
measured. Probably there is adequate reason for approaching mob justice similar to 
any other crime or triggering the same response seen at national level in the wake of 
widespread xenophobic attacks. It is in this view that respondent J’s opinion of a 
multifaceted security effort would assist in early warning. 
The issue of labelling crimes within policy prescripts presents a pitfall in that some 
crimes are concealed or under-reported just because they have no individual 
category. The belief that mob justice falls into the same crime categories as assault, 
attempted murder and murder is limiting and misrepresents the social reality on the 
ground. The reflection of crime statistics of 2011/12 around murder, assault and 
attempted murder tallied to 755 cases. If the respondents’ views on mob justice are 
anything to go by, it will be cumbersome to distinguish which of these cases were 
one-on-one and which were mob justice cases. This unclear description has a direct 
effect in the planning and allocation of resources that would assist in preventative 
measures. 
Unemployment and poverty are labelled as among the causes of mob justice. As 
was presented in the background in chapter one, the survival on limited resources 
propels frustration and tends to trigger conflict towards those who deprive others of 
their hard-earned valuables. While unemployment and poverty fall outside the 
mandate of SAPS, the elementary dent in convincing the community to buy into 
crime prevention strategies should begin with socio-economic improvements. Even if 
that should mean intended programmes that would develop the community. It is such 
optimism that would improve community mobilisation. 
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Stavrou (2011: 8) is a former researcher at the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, in 2011 published a report on “the effects of crime and violence on 
children”. While her focus was on children, the typical findings she expressed are 
applicable to different ages. Her findings were:  
 Fear: the most commonly expressed fears are of the security forces, of future 
attacks especially on the children's homes. 
 Emotional changes: feelings of emotional numbing, powerlessness, of 
extreme vulnerability and a lack of safety. Anxiety, restlessness and irritability. 
Having no interest in life and guilt. No energy and constantly fatigued and 
volatile mood swings. 
Younger children often act much younger than they are by clinging to their 
mother all the time and beginning to wet their beds again, for example. Older 
children tend to become depressed and withdraw into themselves. 
 Difficulty sleeping and dreaming: nightmares about attacks and fear of 
falling asleep. 
 Difficulty thinking: constantly thinking about and re-experiencing the 
traumatic experience. Not being able to concentrate and to remember 
properly. Children's thoughts are negative and they find it difficult to be 
creative. 
 Social difficulties: not wanting to be social with other children, being 
aggressive with others. 
 Eating problems: refusal to eat and loss of appetite. 
 Somatic complaints: mainly in the form of headaches and stomach aches. 
These general stress responses may develop into more distinct emotional, 
behavioural and somatic clusters which indicate the existence of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). The stress reactions may show themselves immediately or 
they may have a delayed onset, implying, showing themselves some weeks, months 
or years after the experience. The symptoms may become cyclical and they can 
reappear and disappear at random. Without treatment, these reactions or symptoms 
may last for decades (Stavrou, 2011: 8). 
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The issues of fear, emotional changes and social difficulties appear to be the more 
applicable in the case of mob justice, in that it glorifies and perpetuates violence, 
therefore the vulnerable element of the community would not have a platform to 
vocally condemn this terror. The emotional and social changes are visible in the 
protectiveness and mistrust when a stranger has to confront the mob attack topic. 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations on a topic like the effects of vigilantism presents a challenge 
of its own because one cannot point out physical measures that have measurable 
outputs. Nonetheless, the impact will be gradual requiring patience and continuity, 
especially when stakeholders are spread across volunteers who receive no incentive 
and employees who have no control over their future utilisation. 
The effort of community mobilisation is a cumbrous exercise that implies the shifting 
of a paradigm around issues on which that community has been socialised. The 
exercise is bound to encounter resistance, disruption and counter-production. The 
community mind-set that mob justice does reduce crime cannot be shifted if the 
effort is unilateral. The current approach of community structures and projects 
require a facelift: 
 Community Policing Forum-it is indeed community based and participants are 
willing to cooperate with the law enforcement agencies. At the same time CPF 
members live with the criminal elements who continue to evade the law. It 
would be important, for combating vigilantism, that a system of protection be 
created that would allow the CPF member who witnessed the mob justice to 
confidently assist the police investigation. Understanding that witness 
protection is costly, the endeavour to eradicate this tendency will be achieved 
through vigorous intervention strategies. 
 Street or Block Committees-there is broad acceptance that these committees 
work together with the CPF structures. The one issue that does not tally with 
the legal framework is their belief that they can preside over certain issues 
and render punishment over cases. If these committees are a community 
resolution then it is paramount that they be integrated under the CPF be 
bound by CPF policy directives. 
 60 
 Community Projects-the roles played by the Youth Desk, Men’s forum, 
Churches Against Crime, Sport Against Crime and patrollers are essential 
since this cover the broader community. There is a need to diversify 
coordination of these projects so that the macro stakeholders can play visible 
role. The diversification should entail that, if the youth should be presented 
with a developmental opportunity, then entities like the National Youth 
Development Agency and the Department of Social Development should be 
mobilised to take a lead role. The role to be played by the Department of 
Sport and Recreation should also drive the initiative where applicable to them. 
 Infrastructure development-the situation of Extensions 1 and 12 presents a 
divisive picture to the community of Diepsloot in that in reference from some 
respondents they would be referred to as shanties (emi-khukhwini). Not that 
such insinuation may catalyse violence but equally may render setbacks like 
impatience on service delivery. It is therefore imperative that the local 
municipality enhances communication on set projects that will improve 
people’s livelihood. 
 Vigilantism vs. crime-there is no reason that mob justice would be still a 
distant threat concept in the Justice Crime Prevention and Security forum. 
The fact that incidents are represented as assault, attempted murder and 
murder will continue to dilute the impact of mob justice in the community of 
Diepsloot and the country at large. If the 755 cases of assault, attempted 
murder and murder of 2011/12 were to be sifted and categorised, there would 
be a good indicator and tip for intervention strategies. Proper impact analysis 
should be initiated from the security cluster and paired with independent 
academic researchers in order to fine-tune intervention strategies. 
 Police capacity-the establishment of the police station in Diepsloot symbolises 
the progress made and the prospective progress yet to be achieved. 
However, the displeasure from the community that there is no visible policing 
warrants a review of the capacity of the station. The paralysis occurring when 
crimes are reported simultaneously increases the community’s resolve on 
self-help. Similar to the point presented in above paragraph, the issue of a 
health centre should be presented emphatically to the Department of Health. 
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In this case, not necessarily primary health-care but a facility that would assist 
police when they require urgent assistance. This would not only be applicable 
to victims of mob justice but as well to victims of other crimes. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Mob justice is a reality and to the community of Diepsloot it is not about statistics. 
Whether the incidents are sporadic and declining, a single incident captures the 
attention of the broader community and thus stays in the mind. This means that even 
if there would be six months of calm the next one will trigger the memory and thus 
reinforce some respondents’ view that mob justice is rampant. 
Diepsloot is supposed to be a success story that should attract the attention of all 
stakeholders from community leadership, service providers and the state. However, 
the situation is hapless purporting despair and pessimism from its community. It is 
supposed to be a success story because Diepsloot is one of the few, if not only, 
settlements that were consciously created in the new dispensation with the potential 
for rapid development. It will be through the success of intended projects that will be 
the yardstick for government service delivery and performance. 
All of the initiatives highlighted in this chapter are currently coordinated centrally by 
the Diepsloot Police Station. While there may be nothing wrong with coordination, 
the local ownership may be impeded in that needs-analysis could be underrated. So 
far there is remarkable participation by few to whom these initiatives appeal. But to 
make an impact, mass mobilisation will be important and the decentralisation of 
coordination and pioneering by local residents will further improve the potential of the 
initiatives. 
This research has proven that mob justice or vigilantism is a reality in, but not limited 
to, Diepsloot. The preventative measures are passive and reactive thus the state 
apparatuses lack capacity to tackle the problem of mob justice. It is therefore safe to 
conclude that this problem will persist into the future, as long as authorities continue 
to shy away from labelling mob justice categorically away from general crime. As a 
result the effect of vigilantism will continue unabated. 
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